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ARBITRATION AND THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD: AN EXAMINATION
OF PREFERENCES AND PREJUDICES
AND THEIR RELEVANCE
DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD*
The author conducted interviews among labor relations practitioners
in order to identify current preferences and prejudices toward arbi-
tration and the National Labor Relations Board. In this article he
analyzes his findings and their impact on both institutions. His
analysis contains many insights into the practical operation of
both decision making processes and provides an empirical founda-
tion for evaluating each institution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz has said that "the enforce-
ability of democratic law depends in the long run upon whether it is
respected."' Since in this country highly individualistic employers, em-
ployees, and unions make a "group of arrangements" which, to a large
extent, determines our labor relations,2 respect for labor laws is not only
hard to engender, it is difficult to measure.3 It is not difficult to evaluate
the late Michael J. Quill's statement, made during the recent New York
City transportation dispute, that "the judge can drop dead in his black
robes and we would not call off the strike. We will defy the injunction
* Associate Professor of Law, The George Washington University Law School.
1 Statement made while a Professor of Law at Northwestern University. Wirtz,
"Board Policy and Labor-Management Relations: 'Employer Persuasion,"' N.Y.U.
7th Ann. Conference on Lab., 79, 106 (1954). Cf. Leedom, "The Scope of Collective
Bargaining," Address before University of Chicago Seminar on Collective Bargaining,
April 16, 1963, Release #916 (Industrial relations often a 'dog eat dog business').
2 Slichter, "The American System of Industrial Relations: Some Contrasts with
Foreign Systems," in Potentials of the American Economy, Selected Essays of Sumner
H. Slichter 271, 272 (Dunlop ed. 1961).
3 See McCulloch, "The NLRB in Action," Address before Eighth Annual joint
Industrial Relations Conference of Michigan State University, April 19, 1962, reported
in 49 LRRM 74 (complex and constantly changing patterns and problems of employer-
employee relations).
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and go to jail."4 Unfortunately, from the academic point of view, much
more subtle attitudes and defiances of law exist. One method of de-
termining "respect" is to examine the beliefs and behaviors of those who
participate in labor relations. However, the impact of these attitudes on
the legal process is not readily apparent although nonetheless signifi-
cant.5 The relationship of "respect" and its impact on labor law can be
brought into focus by considering the manner in which the beliefs and
behavior of the parties involved in labor relations affect their use of the
institutions created and regulated by those who make labor laws. The
purpose of this paper is to investigate preferences and prejudices toward
two such institutions, arbitration and the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB).
A. The Reasons for Including Arbitration and the NLRB in One Study
Obviously separate and continuing study of these institutions is
warranted because the legislative policy of the United States favors
both NLRB protection and voluntary dispute settlement, for example,
arbitration, as methods of promoting industrial stabilization. 6 The
4 N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1966, p. 1, col. 8. The unfortunate and ironic aspect of
this statement by the head of the Transport Workers Union is well known.
5 See generally Jones, "Impact Research and Sociology of Law: Some Tentative
Proposals," 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 331. Cf. Ball & Friedman, "The Use of Criminal Sanc-
tions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View," 17 Stan. L.
Rev. 197, 208-09 (1965) (compliance with economic regulations not wholly determinable
by approval or dissapproval of regulated) referred to in Jones, supra at 338, note 13.
6 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 136
(1947), and 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 151. For convenience the sections cited
will hereinafter be referred to and cited as they appear in Cox & Bok, 1966 Statutory
Supplement to Cases on Labor Law (6th ed. 1966) and popularly known.
Sec. 1:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the
causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and
to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by en-
couraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting
the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotia-
ting the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection.
Sec. 8(a): It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7.
Sec. 10(a): The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any
person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8) affecting com-
merce .... Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 168.
Sec. 203(d) Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over
the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. ...
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statistical involvement of each institution in labor relations also merits
such research. It can be estimated that in 1961 there were approxi-
mately 141,000 grievance arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements in this country.7 The figures published by the NLRB
indicate that in 1965 over 26,000 cases were filed with them.8 However,
neither the legislative policy nor the statistics cited indicate why joint
study on an institutional basis is desirable.
Joint consideration can be justified legalistically because of the
interplay between the arbitral process and the "unfair labor practice"
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The inter-
action may arise after a company and a union representing its employees
negotiate a collective bargaining agreement providing for arbitration of
contractual grievances. Where a dispute arises that is susceptible to
both arbitration and Board adjudication, the question becomes one of
the proper channelization of the dispute. Under what circumstances and
when should company and union disagreement be channeled to arbitra-
tion, and/or the Board?9 For example, refusal to bargain is proscribed
Arbitration is not mentioned in § 203(d) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, see
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566-67 (1959) for judicial construction.
See also United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
(federal policy to promote collective bargaining-major factor in industrial peace is
arbitration clause).
7 The number of collective bargaining agreements was estimated to exceed 150,000
covering almost 17 million employees in 1961. Fleming, "The Labor Arbitration Process
in Labor Arbitration," in Labor Arbitration-Perspectives and Problems 34 (Kahn ed.
1964) [hereinafter cited as 1964- Proceedings NAA]. Estimate of grievance arbitration
clauses in collective bargaining agreements in 1961 was 94%. U.S. Dep't of Labor, "Major
Union Contracts in the United States," 1961 1, Bull. No. 1353 (1962).
8
Case Intake By ULP* Situations & Representative Petitions
Year (Fiscal) Number % Increase
1959** 18,440 cases
1960 19,284 " +04%
1961 21,151 " +10%
1962 23,246 " +10%
1963 23,924 " +037
1964 25,761 " +08%
1965 26,648 " +03%
* Unfair Labor Practice
** 1958 was omitted because of disparate increase of 3,745 cases between 1958-1959.
Figures shown and percentages compiled from 29th Annual Report of NLRB (1964), p. 5.
9 This issue is part of the larger problem of channelization to the courts, arbitration,
and/or the NLRB, or leaving the dispute to be resolved by the parties themselves.
Compare National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61 Stat. 136
(1947), and 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), § 10(a) ". . . this power (Board's
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as an "unfair labor practice" by the National Labor Relations Act
(Wagner Act) as amended.10 The Board is empowered to prevent such
practices." On the other hand, where the scope of the statutory duty
to bargain collectively is bound up with a threshold question of contract
interpretation, the legislative policy has been judicially determined to
favor arbitration. 12 The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(Taft-Hartley Act),13 section 203(d), favors final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the company and union who are parties to the
agreement, for example, arbitration. This interplay between the arbitral
forum and Board determination does not indicate that the two are
alternative forums.' 5 Section 10(a) of the National Labor Relations
Act, as amended, negates such a concept by providing that the Board's
power to prevent unfair labor practices ". . . shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise: .. .."16 Nor is this a
power to prevent any person from engaging in unfair labor practice) shall not be affected
by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by
agreement, law, or otherwise. . ." with Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136
(1947), 29 U.S.C. §§173(d), 185(a), 203(d) "Final adjustment by a method for settlement
of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-
bargaining agreement. . . ," and § 301(a) suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-
merce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect
to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
10 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a),
§ 8(a) "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(5) to refuse to bargain
collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of
section 9 (a)."
11 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136
(1947), and 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).
12 See, e.g., Square D Co. v. N. L. R. B., 332 F.2d 360. 366 (9th Cir. 1964)
(Board order would frustrate act's policy of promoting industrial stabilization through
collective bargaining); Sinclair Refining Co. v. N.L.R.B., 306 F.2d 569, 570-71 (5th
Cir. 1962) (Board adjudication of grievance dispute clashes with policy of effectuating
contractual methods).
13 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151.
14 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), § 203(d) "Final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an
existing collective-bargaining agreement . .. ."
15 See Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271 (1963) (no question
that Board is not precluded from adjudicating unfair labor practices). Cf. Smith v.
Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 199-01 (1962) (Board jurisdiction does not
preclude suit in federal court).
1 Section 10(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 160(a).
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situation where the Board's jurisdiction preempts arbitration. 17 The
problem is one of accommodating the various statutory provisions.
Individuals, companies, unions, and NLRB counsel, by probing for
guide lines in this sensitive area, have shifted from the Board 8 to the
United States Courts of Appeals, 9 and to the Supreme Court of the
United States.2
Undoubtedly there are reasons mitigating against continued re-
search in this area. One reason is that these issues are being dealt with
by judicial determination. However, this begs the question of whether
the courts are the appropriate forum to resolve the policy issues that
underlie the development of appropriate guide lines. At present there
is no indication that the courts will deviate from their ad hoc resolution
by narrow guide lines. Nor is there any indication that the parties will
adhere to this type of solution. Another reason that suggests that con-
tinued research would be futile is that much has already been written
on this subject.2 ' Even though most of these efforts have been by the
traditional law review case-by-case, problem-by-problem analysis, these
studies have the advantage of examining the broader spectrum of the
impact of one solution on another. However, such research overlooks
the effect of suggested solutions on those who are governed, and the
contrapuntal impact by those regulated on these resolutions. Perhaps
the most serious objection to further study is pragmatic. Most cases
17 See Dunau, "Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices: Jurisdictional
Problems," 57 Colum. L. Rev. 52 (1957); Feinberg, "The Arbitrators Responsibility Under
the Taft-Hartley Act," 18 Arb. J. (ns.) 77 (1963); Sovern, "Section 301 and the Primary
Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board," 14 Lab. L.J. 132 (1963) ; Wollet,
"The Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who Should Have Primary
Jurisdiction?" 10 Lab. LJ. 477 (1959).
18 E.g., Operating Engineers, Local 18 [Frazier Davis Construction Co.], 145
N.L.R.B. 1492, 1493-94 (1964) (arbitration decision not repugnant to Act); International
Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962), aff'd sub moma. Ramsey v. N.L.R.B., 327
F.2d 784 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 377 U.S. 1003 (1964) (Board has discretion to reject
arbitration award); I. Oscherwitz and Sons, 130 N.L.R.B 1078, 1079-80 (1961) arbitration
findings fair and regular); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1090 (1955) (Board
established standards of reviewing arbitration decisions).
19 E.g., Square D Company v. N.L.R.B., supra note 12; Sinclair Refining Company v.
N.L.R.B., supra note 12; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 161 F.2d 949, 954 (6th
Cir. 1947) (Board has no power to police collective bargaining contracts).
20 E.g., N.L.R.B. v. Acme Industrial Co., 87 S. Ct. 564 (1967) (Board order to
provide information prior to taking grievance through arbitration permitted). Cf. N.L.R.B.
v. C & C Plywood Corp., 87 S. Ct. 559 (1967) (Board did not exceed jurisdiction by
construing collective bargaining agreement absent arbitration clause).
21 See Lesnick, Arbitration as a Limit on the Discretion of Management, Union, and
NLRB: The Year's Major Developments," in Proceedings On N.Y.U. 18th Ann. Con-
ference On Lab. 7 (BNA 1966); note 12 supra.
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that go to the Board have nothing to do with the collective bargaining
stage since they arise prior to union organization, and, therefore, cannot
go to arbitration. 2 Likewise, most cases that go to arbitration do not
form the basis of meritorious charges with the Board. This objection
quantitatively challenges the significance of the interplay of arbitration
and Board determination on labor relations. On the other hand, Board
Chairman Frank W. McCulloch stated that "statistics are not available
to indicate the number of times that a party resorts to arbitration in
preference to filing a charge with the Board... [he was] sure that this
was true in the majority of situations."' Even though this is not re-
sponsive to the question of how many times the alternative is available,
it does require an answer as to why this preference. On balance it must
be admitted that consideration of the interplay may be esoteric, but
there are additional reasons that justify continued research.
The social interest in the interplay between the two processes
arises from the interaction of public and private policy. An explanation
of this nexus is contained in the "rights theory."'24 Although the "rights"
provided for by the federal labor law statutes are exercised by private
parties filing charges with the Board, these rights are considered
"public" and within the jurisdiction of the NLRB.2 5 However, the
theory explains, when the Wagner Act26 established "public rights"
they were quickly adopted into collective bargaining agreements as
"private rights," and were frequently so enmeshed that it was impos-
sible to separate them. When the Board deals with "public rights"
22 This assumption cannot be supported by empirical data because the Board does
not break down unfair labor practice cases by stage of organization.
23 McCulloch, "Arbitration and/or the NLRB," 18 Arb. J. (n.s.) 3, 4 (1963).
24 See generally Christensen, "Arbitration, Section 301, and the National Labor
Relations Theories," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 411 (1962).
25 Amalgamated Workers v. Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 269 (1940) (Board seeks
enforcement as public agent not to give effect to private administrative remedy). National
Labor Relations Board, Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure, Series 8,
as amended, revised Jan. 1, 1965, Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401 [hereinafter cited as 'Rules and Regs'] Sec. 102.9-
"A charge that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice
may be made by any person" (emphasis added). Contra, "Unfair labor practice cases are
private law suits-nothing more." Congressman Landrum, 109 Cong. Rec. 15198 (daily ed.
Aug. 27, 1963).
26 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
27 Christensen, supra note 24, at 443; Miller, "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme:
Some Observations on Judge Friendly's Call for Better Definition of Standards, 9 How.
L.J. 68, 76-77 (1963) (as line between private and public activity blurs so does line
between public and private law). Note that the tribunitial attributes of an agency are not
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that are also a breach of contract or when the arbitrator deals with
"private rights" that are also a violation of statute, the rationale of this
distinction is limited and the rights are mixed. The social policy ex-
pressed by the statute may also be muted. This may be merely another
way of expressing the interplay issue discussed previously. However,
positing the question in this manner pinpoints the policy issue. What
is the social policy behind the establishment of "public rights," and is it
effectuated through the exercise of "private rights"? For example, when
the parties agree to arbitration as a manner of dispute resolution in the
collective bargaining agreement, what social policies should prompt the
Board to defer to arbitration? Chairman McCulloch acknowledged
Board deference to arbitration as the desideratum by stating that it
was the,
experience-tested means of settling disputes in the administration
of contracts, often far better adopted than the Board to quick reso-
lution, to comprehending practical plant situations, to devising
remedies of greater flexibility, and to taking account of the special
unique needs of the on-going, day-to-day relationship of the parties
to collective compacts.2
His statement indicates that where the parties have worked out a pro-
vision to arbitrate their disputes, "experience" warrants Board defer-
ence. This opinion has been subject to severe criticism lately.2" The
conflicting attitudes of knowledgeable participants in labor relations
toward the arbitration process and Board adjudication bears investiga-
tion.
analogous to the arbitral forum because: (1) arbitration is not a public tribunal, (2)
arbitrator has no general charge to administer justice for community which transcends
parties, and (3) arbitrator is part of system of self-government established by collective
bargaining agreement.
28 McCulloch, "The Arbitration Issue in National Labor Board Decisions," 19 Arb.
J. (n.s.) 134, 136 (1964).
20 Including Board Insistence that deference is discretionary. N.L.R.B. v. Huttig
Sash and Door Company, Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1965), No. 18451 (8th Cir. 1966).
See generally Hays, Labor Arbitration a Dissenting View, (Yale 1966). See also Fleming,
The Labor Arbitration Process (Ill. 1965); Ross, "Distressed Grievance Procedures and
Their Rehabilitation," in Labor Arbitration and Industrial Change 104 (Kahn ed. 1963)
[hereinafter cited as 1963 Proceedings NAA]; Stowe, "Comments on Arbitration," in
Proceedings of N.Y.U. 19th Ann. Conference on Labor, as reported in 61 LRR 243, 245
(1966). For other citations of growing criticism of arbitral process, see Jones & Smith,
'Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report
with Comments," 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1115, 1152 n.2 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jones &
Smith, "Report with Comments"]. Cf. Lesnick, supra note 21, at 25-36 (delays might
impair statutory rights).
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B. Arbitration and the NLRB: Some Contradictory Observations
1. Arbitration: The Douglas-Hays' Opinions
Mr. Justice Douglas opined that,
the labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the parties'
confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop and
their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear considerations
which are not expressed in the contract as criteria for judgment ....
[T] he parties' objective in using the arbitration process is primarily
to further their common goal of uninterrupted production under
the agreement, to make the agreement serve their specialized needs.
The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the same experience
and competence to bear upon the determination of a grievance,
because he cannot be similarly informed.30
In a recent book Judge Paul R. Hays of the United States Court of
Appeals, Second Circuit, bluntly expressed his dissent.31
It is the submission of this book that there is no authority to support
the view of arbitration adopted in the Steelworkers cases. [supra]
There have been no extensive studies of the arbitration process
that would establish the validity of the propositions advanced in
those cases. (All italicized in original.)3 2
This disagreement goes far beyond refuting the empiric evidence on
which Mr. Justice Douglas' statements are based. Judge Hays charges
that "in literally thousands of cases every year decisions are made by
arbitrators who are wholly unfitted for their jobs, who do not have the
requisite knowledge, training, skill, or intelligence, or character."
33
"A system of adjudication," he continues, "in which the judge depends
for his livelihood or even for substantial supplements to his regular
income, on pleasing those who hire him to judge is per se a thoroughly
undesirable system." 34 He concludes,
there are certain procedural advantages in arbitration which some
would want to see preserved. There is nothing about those pro-
cedural aspects that makes them indissolubly a part of a private
system of judicial administration. They could all be readily adapted
to a public system of justice and made available in our courts.35
30 United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 6, at 582.
31 Hays, op. cit. supra note 29.
C2 Id. at 9.
33 Id. at 112.
34 Ibid. Compare Mr. James Hoffa's statement, "arbitrators split it down the middle,
half for you, half for me. If they don't they get scratched off the list the next time
somebody needs an arbitrator." Baltimore Evening Sun, Jan. 29, 1957, cited in 9 Lab.
L.J. 187, 194 (1958).
35 Hays, op. cit. supra note 29 at 116.
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To accept either view in this dispute is to fall prey to Judge Hays'
admonition that there is insufficient evidence to support (or deny) these
propositions. Furthermore, to accept one side and shunt the other is to
ignore the personal observation of a knowledgeable participant in labor
relations and obviate analysis.
2. NLRB Adjudication: Landrum-Griffin-The Board
Congressman Robert P. Griffin stated in 1961, in a separate view
appended to the Report of the Subcommittee on National Labor Rela-
tions Board of the Committee on Education and Labor, that "delays
by the Board in case handling has been a problem since its inception." '36
During a 1962 speech delivered to the House of Representatives,
Congressman Phil M. Landrum argued that,
the adjudication of cases has been entrusted by Congress to the
NLRB ... The law spells out in definite terms the conduct which
constitutes . . . unfair labor practices . . . Congress not the labor
Board determines America's labor-management policy . . . /the
Board has/a judicial role, not a policy making role.37
One year later, when Congressman Landrum introduced a bill to divest
the Board of its adjudicative function by transferring jurisdiction over
unfair labor practices to the federal district courts,3" his justification was
that "Congress has been patient, tolerant, and helpful to the NLRB for
more than 25 years. The National Labor Relations Board by its own
decisions has demonstrated that it respects neither the letter of the law
nor the intent of Congress.
M 9
On February 10, 1962 Member Brown took issue with Congress-
man Landrum's opinion of the Board's role by stating that "in my view
36 House Subcommittee on NLRB, 57th Cong. 1st Sess., Report on Administration of
Labor-Management Relations Act by NLRB 65 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Pucinski Report].
37 108 Cong. Rec. 6190, 6195 (1962).
38 H.R. 8246, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. (1963).
39 Id. at 6190. Compare Shapiro, "The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921 (1965) (legislature must
normally confine itself to declaration of generally applicable standards) with Fick, "Issues
and Accomplishments in Administrative Regulations: Some Political Aspects," 26 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 283, 287 (1961) (sometimes congressional organization unable to deal
with administrative bureaucracy). See also McGinness, The New Frontier NLRB 237
(1963), "[T]he new Board's divided opinions provide an impressive basis for the con-
clusions that the Kennedy majority is undermining the purpose of the statute, frustrating
the intent of Congress, and demoralizing major areas of labor-management relations."
From 1954 on, Mr. McGinness was Associate Chief Counsel for Board members Beeson,
Farmer and Leedom. Served as Associate General Counsel under Theophil C. Kammholz,
and then received a recess appointment as General Counsel and served for several months,
supra p. iii.
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the Board is unquestionably a policy making tribunal."40 Five days
later, not unmindful of growing congressional criticism, Chairman
McCulloch retorted,
our objective, and here I speak for the whole Board, is a large one;
universal acceptance by labor and by management of the policies
set forth originally in the 1935 Wagner Act and contained in every
amendment thereto; to substitute for industrial strife the practice
and procedures of free collective bargaining, in a system which
accepts individual innovation and individual rights . . . . I could
perhaps wish that the provisions of the Act were so crystal clear
and the cases which arise under it so stereotyped that the applica-
tion of the law would be a purely mechanical operation. But this
is not the situation. We are not administering an exact system
of mathematics. 4'
The volume of contradictory observations about arbitration and
NLRB adjudication would provide enough material for numerous
articles. The quotations cited above are sufficient to illustrate the
disputes. These conflicting opinions should be analyzed in terms of the
institutional processes involved. Professor Cox provided a reason in an
address before the Section of Labor Law of the American Bar Associa-
tion. "The procedures and institutions we establish," he said, "will
determine the balance between the elements of coercion and submission,
on the one hand, and, on the other, of permission and consent."42
C. Bases of Contradictory Observations, Variables and Method of
Evaluation
It must be assumed that the contradictory observations are em-
pirically founded, because each person propounding his opinion has
broad experience in the field. However, this does not mean that each
appraisal takes into account the experience of the party whose opinions
40 Brown, "Member Brown Views the Labor Board as Policymaking Tribunal, Board
release cited in 108 Cong. Rec. 6191 (1962). But see Congressman Griffin's reply to this
statement, "let there be no mistake about the fundamental issue [it] ... comes down to
responsibility for determining public policy." Ibid.
41 McCulloch, "The How and Why of Recent NLRB Decisions," address before the
American Management Association Mid-Winter Personnel Conference at Chicago, III.
on Feb. 15, 1962 (Press Release to P.M. Newspapers R-842). See also speech given same
month by judge Henry J. Friendly at Harvard Law School Holmes Lectures. "An
agency that has done much to translate the general words of its charter into more specific
guides for behavior by the regulated and decision by the regulators is the National
Labor Relations Board." Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, The Need for
Better Definition of Standards 36 (1962).
42 Cox, "The Future of Collective Bargaining," Address before Section of Labor Law
of American Bar Association on Aug. 8, 1961, in 48 LRRM 28, 35.
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are contradictory. The polarity of attitudes provides a key for evalua-
tion.
1. Polarity and Myopia
Before attempting to formulate the bases of the assertions, it is
possible to hypothesize that the polar opinions indicate that each stated
position ignores the basic assumptions implicit in the conflicting opinion.
For example, when Mr. Justice Douglas indicated the reasons why
arbitrators were chosen, his explanation was based on the importance of
expertise when brought to bear on specialized problems which lend
themselves to a system of self government--"knowledge of the common
law of the shop."43 Judge Hays states that if this means the parties
choose an arbitrator to obtain a "philosopher king," his experience
suggests otherwise.44 "On the contrary," he states, "most employers and
unions choose arbitrators who will go strictly by the statute law of their
relationship (i.e., the contract) and not by the so-called common law of
the shop... ." The conflicting opinions are premised on the alternative
bases of "the selection process," "expertise," and "limited invasion of
each party's prerogatives." On the other hand, when Judge Hays
castigates a system wherein the judge is beholden to the parties who
select him and calls for adopting arbitration in the courts, his concern
is that this process as it now exists should not be given carte blanche
approval by our judicial system.46 He notes the problems of "award
splitting,) 47 "rigged awards,"4" and "judicial review."49 However, his
suggestion that the procedural advantages of arbitration could be
readily adapted to a public system of justice 0 ignores Mr. Justice
Douglas' (and Chairman McCulloch's) concern over flexibility.5 The
latter anxiety is directed to the factors of "caseload," "time lag,"
and "costs" in the arbitration process. This paper will examine arbitra-
tion in light of the "selection process" and the basis of concern over
"expertise," "award splitting," "invasion of prerogatives," "judicial
review," "caseload," and "costs."
43 United Steelworkers v. Warner & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 6. Compare, "the
weighing of the arbitrator's greater institutional competency, which was so vital to those
decisions [Steelworkers trilogy], must be evaluated in that context." NL.R.B. v. Acme
Industrial Co., Docket No. 52, October Term, Jan. 9, 1967, United States Supreme Court.
44 Hays, op. cit. supra note 29, at 41.
45 Ibid.
46 Id. at 192.
47 Id. at 52.
48 Id. at 62.
49 Id. at 19-34.
60 See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
51 See notes 28 and 30 supra and accompanying text.
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2. The Variables
The alternative bases underlying the dispute over the "policy-
making" role of the Board are not as clear as those that under-
lie the disagreement in evaluating the arbitral forum. This is because
of the difficulty in understanding the role of the political process-
"that which made it necessary in the first place to create such a
system of fuzzy standards."52 Since the NLRB is administering stand-
ards set by Congress, "Congress itself-or at least Congressmen as
individuals-is one of the constituencies of the agencies which must
be satisfied." 3 This situation has led one commentator to observe that
"the administrative agencies are politics in action."54 Thus, one variable
might be termed the "political factor." Congressman Landrum at-
tempted to avoid such analysis and focus on the judicial aspect of the
Board (unfair labor practice jurisdiction) by tracing his discontent
with the Board for twenty-five years. 5 Assuming, arguendo, that this
is not the "out party" challenging the "in party," is the disagreement
simply a matter of the Board's refusal to apply the letter of the law?
The co-authors of the Landrum-Griffin bill argued that they attempted
to close the loopholes in the Taft-Hartley Act created by the Board, but
that it had frustrated this intent as evidenced by its handling of
"secondary boycotts," "hot cargo provisions," "free speech," "black-
mail picketing," and "employer coercion" during a strike.56 Were these
examples of the law that spelled out in "definite terms the conduct that
constitutes unfair labor practices"?5 7 Even if one could accept this
unlikely view, can it be seriously contended that Congress could have
contemplated all the situations that might arise when the statute was
drafted? Even if this were possible, the changing context of the labor
field makes it impracticable, even without widespread disagreement, to
draft such an all-inclusive statute.58 Moreover, the Congressmen's al-
legations of injudicious behavior did not adequately consider the im-
52 Miller, supra note 27, at 78.
53 Id. at 70.
54 Id. at 71.
55 See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
56 108 Cong. Rec. 6190-94 (1962).
57 Id. at 6190.
58 See Hall, "Responsibility of the President and Congress for Regulatory Policy
Development," 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 261, 275 (1961) (inconsistency in legislation
reflects inconsistency in country at large); Miller, supra note 27 at 70 (standards are
resultant parallelogram of conflicting political forces) quoting Fainsod, "Some Reflections
on the Nature of the Regulatory Process in Public Policy," The Yearbook of the
Graduate School of Public Administration of Harvard University 297, 298 (1940).
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pact of court decisions on the Board. Congressman Landrum contended
that the courts traditionally deferred to the Board; 1 but Chairman
McCulloch later claimed that Board successes before the United States
Supreme Court in the 1959-1961 terms were less than spectacular. 0
Although the Congressmen undeniably felt the statute which they had
drafted was being misapplied, the underlying issue was the "political
factor." If this dispute revolves around the traditional contest over
separation of powers, that is which branch of government should make
policy, then the Congressmen's attitude is myopic. To express the prob-
lem in the political scientist's focus, the fact is that when the govern-
ment ".... vests the underlying powers with the administrative authority
it creates, [it does so] not too greatly concerned with the traditional
tripartite theory of governmental organization. The dominant theme in
the administrative structure is thus determined not primarily by
political conceptualism but rather by concern for an industry whose
economic health has become a responsibility of government." 61 Evalua-
tion should be in terms of economic effects. Is the Board process, as part
of the political process, helping to reach the desired ends? This paper
will investigate the "political factor" in terms of Board structure,
"caseload," and "time lag."
3. The Premise and Method of Evaluation to be Used
The stated purpose of this article is to investigate the preferences
and prejudices of participants in labor relations and their relevance to
the arbitration and NLRB processes. Even though contradictory
observations have been made, there are basic issues that underlie these
conflicting opinions. The premise of this article is that these underlying
issues concern process and not specific decisions rendered, although the
latter can create conflict also. Since conflicting opinions as to institu-
tional process are subjective and highly individualistic, research in this
area should be empiric and personal. The approach used in this in-
vestigation was to use the interview technique. The parties whose
opinions were solicited (referred to as "participants") were arbitrators
(including educators working in labor relations);62 lawyers familiar
59 108 Cong. Rec. 6190 (1962) (courts defer to expertise of Board and have been
reluctant to upset its decisions).
60 During 1959-60 NLRB lost five out of six decisions in U.S. Supreme Court. In
1960-61 it won three and one-half cases out of nine. McCulloch, op. cit. supra note 41.
01 Landis, The Administrative Process 11-12 (1938) cited in Hall, supra note 58,
at 273 to indicate that the unity is caused by the industries regulated, i.e. their unity.
62 The arbitrators interviewed were: Professor D.V. Brown (Massachusetts Institute
of Technology) on Dec. 20, 1965; Mr. John W. Church (Regional Manager of the Ameri-
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with the operation of both institutions (representing management or
unions) ; " and NLRB personnel. 4 No attempt was made to achieve a
valid sample, nor to statistically verify the responses as being repre-
sentative. The participants65 were selected because of their status,
experience, and knowledge in the field. The objective was to analyze the
attitudes of this group about the institutional processes. The method
used was to interview each participant at length about his experience
and opinions. 6 Questions were asked sporadically to allow narrative
answers, and were phrased broadly to elicit independent critical
evaluation of the basic problems in each process. The resulting informa-
tion was then carefully reviewed in four steps. First, the comments were
grouped into major topics and subtopics wherever possible. Second,
these topics were analyzed to determine any "patterns of response."
Whenever patterns developed, an attempt was made to relate them to
other patterns. The purpose was to develop a critique of the processes.
Third, this critique was evaluated in light of existing empirical research.
Fourth, this critique was examined for possible impact on the institu-
tions considered. The results follow.
can Arbitration Association) on numerous occasions; Professor John T. Dunlop (Harvard
University) on Oct. 30, 1965; Mr. Win. J. Fallon (professional arbitrator) on Feb. 3,
1966; Professor James Healy (Harvard Business School) on Feb. 12, 1966; Professor
Thomas Kennedy (Harvard Business School, Vice President of National Academy of
Arbitrators) on Mar. 18, 1966; and Mr. Saul Wallen (professional arbitrator) on Nov. 2,
1965.
63 Attorneys interviewed were: Mr. Arthur J. Flamm (Segal & Flamm) on Jan. 27,
1966; Mr. George Foley (Hale & Dorr) on Feb. 18, 1966; Mr. Lawrence Fordham (Foley,
Hoag & Elliot) on Mar. 18, 1966; Mr. James Grady (Grant & Angoff) on Feb. 4, 1966;
Mr. Sam Leiter (Gordon & Leiter) on Feb. 3, 1966; Mr. Robert D. Manning (Grant &
Angoff) on Feb 4, 1966; Harold Roitman, Esq. on Mar. 18, 1966; Mr. Vernon C. Stone-
man (Stoneman & Chandler) on Feb. 4, 1966; Mr. Alan A. Tepper (Schneider & Tepper)
on numerous occasions; and Mr. Frank Vaas (Ropes & Gray) on Feb. 3, 1966.
64 NLRB personnel were interviewed on numerous occasions in connection with
statistical and other research done in the Boston Regional Office. They were: Mr. Edward
Goodstein (Organization and Methods Division, Wash., D.C.); Mr. Art Hoban (Regional
Director of Boston Office); and Mr. Harold Kowal (Assistant Regional Attorney).
65 With the exception of Mr. Ratner (who was selected for his knowledge in the
field and experience with "watchdog" Congressional Committees) and Mr. Goodstein
(interviewed by phone in regard to statistical methods used and information available),
the parties were selected wholly from the Boston, Massachusetts area. The prevalence of
educational institutions in this area with highly qualified personnel was advantageous, but
perhaps atypical; and certain evaluations may have limited application.
66 The average interview was well over an hour, and the author is grateful for the
participants' unstinting cooperation. The method of interviewing was discursive and
narrative to the extent possible, since "phrasing questions" might yield limited responses
that would not reflect the participants' "preferences and prejudices."
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II. EVALUATION OF ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB BY THE
PARTICIPANTS
A. Arbitrators and the Arbitral Process
A brief statement is necessary to indicate the type of arbitration
that the following comments concern. Generally, third party roles en-
compass what is referred to as "arbitration. '67 For the purposes of this
paper "arbitration" will indicate the situation where a third party
neutral arbitrator is called in by the parties to adjudicate (as opposed
to mediate) a dispute. Actually this type of arbitration is also flexible
in form including: "permanent" (permanent umpires, impartial chair-
men, and permanent panels)o and "ad hoc" arbitration; and tripartite
boards 9 as well as single arbitrators. A 1964 survey indicates that
63.8 percent of the arbitrators' caseload is "ad hoc," 32.2 percent
permanent umpire, and 4 percent permanent panels.70 Arbitration when
used in this paper will refer to the process, when requested by the
67 Cole, "Discussion-Neutral Consultants in Collective Bargaining." in Collective
Bargaining and the Arbitrator's Role 96 (Kahn ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as 1962 Pro-
ceedings NAA]. See also Chamberlain, supra p. 83. See generally Elkouri & Elkouri, How
Arbitration Works 48-77 (Rev. ed. 1960).
68 For a discussion of the types and lingering effects of the mediator-arbitrator see
Killingsworth and Wallen, "Constraint & Variety in Arbitration Systems," in 1964
Proceedings NAA 56.
69 See Abeam, "The Operation of Tripartite Agencies in Labor-Management Rela-
tion," 7 Arb. J. 210 (1957); Lesser, "Tripartite Boards or Single Arbitrators in Voluntary
Labor Arbitration?" 12 De Paul L. Rev. 125 (1962). For a new appraisal of the effective-
ness of tripartite arbitration see Fleming, op cit. supra note 29, at 221-22.
70
Percentage Distribution of Arbitration Caseload (NAA Figures)
Permanent
(Umpire &/ Penn.
Year No. of Responses* "Ad Hoc" or Chairmen) Panels
1962 160 72.7% 18% 9.3%
1964 98 63.8% 32.2% 4.0%
Increase
or/
Decrease - 62 -8.9% +14.2%** +5.3%
* Number of responses to National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) Survey.
** Trend from 1952-1962 down, reversed 1962-1964 period.
Figures compiled from Survey Committee, "Appendix D Survey of Arbitration in
1964" [hereinafter cited as 1964 Survey], in Proceedings of the 18th Ann. Meeting of
the NAA 243-54 (Jones ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as 1965 Proceedings NAA]; and
Survey Committee, Appendix C Survey of Arbitration in 1962 [hereinafter cited as "1962
Survey"], in 1964 Proceedings NAA 292-316.
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parties, whereby a single "ad hoc" arbitrator is designated unless the
facts discussed are of general application or otherwise stated.
Although consensus was not a prerequisite to consideration of
opinions put forth, the factors of flexibility (as indicated by the above
discussion) and speed were unanimously stated as the prime advantage
of the arbitration process over NLRB adjudication.7 1 Insofar as possible
problem areas for consideration, the responses indicated the following as
susceptible to criticism; the selection process, time lag, and costs. They
will be considered in detail.
1. The Selection Process: Mutuality and Expertise
An initial pattern of response from the participants was that the"
single most important factor in arbitration was the selection of the
"right" arbitrator. For example, the comment was made that "50 per-
cent of the battle insofar as the outcome was concerned was in the
selection of the arbiter.17  Since arbitration was called an "art form"
rather than a "legal form" by one of the participants, who then is the
"artist"? What is his background? How does he become recognized?
And most important, why is "his work" selected?
Fortunately, statistics are available from a survey that enable a
general description of the average arbitrator (at least as of 1962) 71 who
turns out to be anything but "average." He is almost sixty years of
age,74 has a high school degree,75 and seven and one-half years of college
and graduate study.76 His fields of study were probably economics in
college 7 7 and either economics or law in graduate school.78 Chances
71 See Jones & Smith, supra note 29, at 1116 (comparing arbitration to courts or
pure collective bargaining).
72 Complete anonymity was assured before the interviews, and therefore none of
the participants will be directly quoted unless permission has been obtained.
73 "1962 Survey," supra note 70, at 303 (figures compiled from 194 responses).
74 A comparison of the statistics compiled by the "1962 Survey", ibid, taken by the
NAA with those compiled by the AAA appearing in Coulson, "Spring Checkup on Labor
Arbitration," 16 Lab. L.J. 259, 262 (1965) on the age of arbitrators reveals:
Percentage of Arbitrators by Age Bracket
Agency Under 40 Yrs 40-50 Yrs. 50-60 Yrs. Above
NAA* 4.6% 33.9% 40.8% 20.7%
AAA** 5.1% 24.7% 43.2% 26.8%
* 174 Responses
** 1400 Names on panel
75 "1962 Survey," supra note 70, at 304 (average 3.9 years of high school).
76 Only 3 out of 175 responses indicated they did not have college degree. Id. at 293.
17 Id. at 304 (63 out of 172 responses).
78 Id. at 306 (respectively 68 and 80 out of 168 responses).
[Vol. 28
ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB
are slim that he will be a professional arbitrator (less than two out of
ten), but they are good that he will be an educator (more than four out
of ten) or a lawyer (three out of ten).79 His interest in arbitration, for
the most part, comes from education; 0 or from War Labor Board
experience." It is extremely unlikely that he will have had full time
work with either unions, the labor movement, companies, or employer
associations.8 2 The sources of his "ad hoc" arbitration in 1964 were, in
order of volume, the parties, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS), and the American Arbitration Association (AAA).S3
In spite of the fact that the "artist" is a talented person with a neutral
background and the parties are aware of his background and skills
due to the selection process, there was still a very real concern in his
selection expressed by the participants (particularly by management
counsel). The following questions were asked. Why was there such an
expressed concern for selecting the "right" arbitrator? Why was manage-
ment counsel apparently more concerned in this matter than union
counsel? How does the selection process operate to accommodate this
concern? What are the effects of the selection process?
(a) The Basis of Concern
Even though the lawyers interviewed were practically unanimous in
attributing importance to the selection process, once the question
"why" was broached the unanimity (and perhaps the candor) broke
down. The reasons most frequently mentioned a's to why it is so im-
portant to select the "right" arbiter were: (1) expertise and ability, (2)
the undesirable practice of "award splitting," (3) the increasing
tendency of arbitrators to invade management prerogatives, and (4) the
finality of the arbiter's award (limitation of review). Other singular
79 Coulson, supra note 74, at 263.
80 "1962 Survey," supra note 70, at 306 (48% reported interest arose from education).
81 But see Coulson, supra note 74, at 262 (folklore of arbitration).
82 "1962 Survey," supra note 70, at 307 (93.7% had no fulltime experience with
labor movement; 83.3% none with management).
83
Sources of "Ad Hoc" Arbitration (Percentages)
State Survey
Year Parties AAA FMCS Agencies Responses
1952 64.7% (Lowest) (Lowest) (Lowest) (Unknown)
1962 30.0% 24.2% 4.6% 11.2% 173 Responses
1964 42.5% 19.2% 24.9% 9.7% 93 Responses
Comparison of "1964 Survey," supra note 70, at 251 with "1962 Survey," supra note
70, at 308.
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responses indicated that the importance attributed had the effect of
slowing down the process, and impressing clients. Before any analysis
is undertaken it is important to note that the fact that some of these
reasons may not fully withstand the challenge of logical appraisal does
does not render them insignificant, because the irrational prejudices of
the parties can motivate actions as readily as rational preferences.
However, analysis of some of the major reasons given for selecting the
"right" arbitrator is nonetheless necessary to understand the selection
process.
(1) Expertise and Ability
If "expertise" refers to knowledge gained through experience in
dealing with a particular industry, as opposed to general knowledge, it
is relevant criteria. For example, problems dealing with "job classifica-
tion" and "work assignments" require specialized "know-how." How-
ever, the participants' attitudes of preferring "old line arbitrators"
(those with War Labor Board, WLB, experience) or refusing to select
"new faces" cannot be supported by this example. As one participant
pointed out, WLB experience could not be equated with technical ex-
pertise since it was far more limited in scope. Furthermore, it was
indicated that "expertise" must be related to a given problem, and so
it was ridiculous to use it as a constant when the problem was technical
(such as job classification) as well as when it was non-technical (for
example disciplinary cases)."4
Ability is the "raison d'etre" for selecting an arbitrator, but it is
generic in that it includes all of the reasons for selecting one man as
opposed to another. One prominent pattern of response was that
"ability" meant the competence to control a hearing thereby cutting
delay and costs, and the skill to clarify issues and render a precise
award."5 This type of "ability" is the basis of the arbitral process. The
problem becomes how is this type of ability to be determined by the
selection process without personal contact? Although reading prior
decisions to discover the reasoning process behind the award may
indicate a basis for exclusion, it does not provide a basis for excluding
an untried arbitrator or determining how the hearing was handled.
With the above stated limitations, expertise and ability must be
acknowledged as valid criteria.
84 Job classification and work assignments comprised 10.1% of caseload while
disciplinary cases accounted for 18.8% in 1964. "1964 Survey," supra note 70, at 247.
85 See generally "Editorial-The Hazards of Dicta in Labor Arbitration," 19 Arb.
J. (n.s.) 68 (1964).
[VoI. 28
ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB
(2) Award Splitting
This phrase, normally thought to indicate the undesirable pro-
pensity to render approximately the same number of awards for each
side, may also refer to splitting the decision itself.8 6 For example, it
may refer to the remedy in a discharge case of directing reinstatement
of an employee but without back pay on the basis that discharge is too
harsh even though some discipline is warranted. On the other hand, the
phrase may refer to splitting reinstatement awards half favoring
management and the other half for the union. Statements made by
participants that they would not try two cases involving the same
parties before the same arbitrator on the same day because of splitting
decisions may refer to splitting the awards. However, other comments
to the effect that although splitting was not likely to occur when the
case was clear but might "carry the day" on close questions could relate
to either concept of "splitting." To analyze this problem it is necessary
to examine a case as it appears to the parties and to the arbiter. From
the standpoint of the parties, if their cause is poor they will know it
and there will be no reason to split it in either sense . 7 If, however,
the question is close (as most cases are) both parties will probably have
gone through the rationalizing process to the extent of convincing
themselves of the efficacy of their cause. In this sense one party will
"lose." To split by case, therefore, does not absolve the arbiter from
the fact that "one man's pleasure is his opponent's pain."88 Moreover
"ad hoc" arbitrators are rarely before the same parties within a short
period of time so the pain cannot be quickly relieved. To "split the
remedy" assumes that neither party, convinced of their case, will
assume this a loss. All of this rests on the rather shaky premise that
both the arbiter and the parties have the same view of the case. As one
of the arbitrator's interviewed pointed out, there is a tremendous
variation in case presentation so that what is abundantly clear to the
parties may be unclear to the arbiter. Even assuming that the arbitrator
is in the same "control" of the facts as the parties, other reasons for
not splitting come into play. His ego as a neutral does not encourage
him to play such a role. The great majority of arbitrators do not put
86 Elkouri & Elkouri, op. cit. supra note 67, at 57. Collateral problem of whether
"permanent" or "ad hoc" arbitrator more likely to split (considered debatable).
87 The countervailing pressures of bringing "poor cases" in order to win on percent-
ages are: (1) the duty of fair representation, and (2) breeding lack of confidence by
pressing poor claims. The permanent arbitrator would be in a better position to recognize
this. Id. at pp. 57-58.
88 See Wallen, Arbitrators and judges: Dispelling the Hays' Haze, Paper delivered
at Twelfth Annual Institute on Labor Law sponsored by the Southwestern Legal
Foundation, Oct. 29, 1965.
1967]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
"all their eggs in one basket," and the luxury of having more than one
client affords them independence. 89 Further, there are a substantial
minority of arbiters who have other types of employment, and are
also free of such pressures.90 Despite the factors mitigating against
splitting, it is not so easy to evaluate the subconscious tendency to
equivocate. As one of the participants admitted, it cannot be said with
assurance that all arbitrators will react alike to a situation where a man
with twenty-five years seniority has been discharged. Furthermore, an
arbitrator may react differently where the proof of an allegation is
questionable than in a situation where the allegation itself is question-
able. There may be different reactions to situations where the impact
of the decision falls on one person as opposed to a number of people.
Indeed, there may be subconscious tendencies to split (in either sense)
even though a strong argument can be made against the probability of
conscious splitting. Finally, it would be less than candid to conclude
that the sample of arbitrators interviewed in the Boston area can be
used to evaluate all arbiters in face of Judge Paul R. Hays' empiric
evaluations. 91 The point is that if this problem is so difficult to evaluate
on an intellectual basis or by interview, how can the selection process
serve to clarify it?
(3) The Alleged Invasion of "Management" Prerogatives
The prolixity of articles written on this subject is probably
explained by the various meanings attached to the phrase "management
prerogative."92 There is little pragmatic value to be obtained from an-
other decision on the merits as to which theory is right. Several responses
indicated that this entire problem merely reflects subjective attitudes
toward the status quo. Thus, "invasion of prerogatives" is a phrase
89 Ibid.
90 As of 1962 only 33.4% of the arbitrators' time was spent in arbitration. "1962
Survey," supra note 70, at 310.
91 "In [Judge Hays'] opinion no decision of arbitration which does not consider
the affect of the arbitrator's decision on the good will of the parties is completely honest."
Hays, Labor Arbitration a Dissenting View 113 (Yale 1966).
92 As examples of some of the contradictory ideas in this area, compare Cox,
"Reflections Upon Labor Law," 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1499 (1959) (filing in interstices
of agreement) with Burstein, "Labor Arbitration-A Management View," N.Y.U. 10th
Ann. Conference on Lab. 297, 298 (BNA 1961) (filling in interstices is legislative act).
Compare Seward, "Reexamining Traditional Concepts," in 1964 Proceedings NAA 240,
244 (implied obligations dried-up, useless argument) with O'Connell, "Should the Scope
of Arbitration Be Restricted," in 1965 Proceedings NAA 102, 109 (muddy thinking rather
than invalidity in re implied obligations). See generally Wallen, "The Silent Contract vs.
Express Provisions: The Arbitration of Local Working Conditions," in 1962 Proceedings
NAA 117.
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used to denote an intrusion on one party's subjective view of his rights
as opposed to his opponent's rights. One participant explained that the
gamut of emotions runs from the feeling that the existence of a union
infringes on management prerogatives to righteous indignation against
an arbitrator's decision that is in direct contradiction to an express
provision in a collective bargaining agreement. The incidence of the
former attitude is greater, he suggested, than the occurrence of the
latter type of decision.
The responses all indicated that an invasion of the status quo, as
viewed from either management or the union's vantage, necessitates
the selection process. For example, management counsel would use the
selection process to pick an arbitrator, acceptable to the other party,
whose past decisions were rational and as close to the desired result
as possible. 3 The selection process thus enables the other side to
balance out this effort. The pattern of responses indicates that neither
side would accept "ad hoc" arbitration as readily as they do now
without this process.
(4) Judicial Review
The fact that the arbitrators' decisions have been accorded con-
siderable finality by judicial determination94 evoked criticism from the
participants. The comments can be divided roughly into two main cate-
gories. One type went to the role of the arbitral process in the adminis-
tration of justice. This can be illustrated by Judge Hays' discussion of
"rigged awards," an award which is the product of an agreement
between an employer and a union, in his book. He states that "rigged
awards are a shocking distortion of the administration of justice,"
and should not be condoned by the courts." The implications of
limited review of arbitration on the judicial process have been discussed
elsewhere,96 and need not be considered here. However, the other
93 Query: what does the sentence (in the Code of Ethics for Arbitration), "a party
should not seek to obtain the appointment of an arbitrator in the belief that he will
favor that party and thereby give him an advantage over his adversary," mean?
American Arbitration Association & National Academy of Arbitrators, Code of Ethics
and Procedural Standards for Labor-Management Arbitration 8, § 3 (AAA-1OM-3-57).
Q4 "An order to arbitrate should not be denied unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause it not susceptible of such an interpretation." United
Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nay. Co., supra note 6, at 582. "He [the arbitrator]
may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement." United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
95 Hays, op. cit. supra note 91, at 62-66.
96 For discussions of procedural arbitrability see Dunau, "Procedural Arbitrabity-
A Question for Court or Arbitrator," 14 Lab. LJ. 1010 (1963); Note, "Procedural
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category of comment by the participants concerned the impact of
limited review on the selection process, and is relevant. This considera-
tion involves the relationship of finality of awards vis-a-vis the arbi-
trators' power to affect the balance of power between management
and a union. For example, one theory advocates "finality" because of
speed and recourse against a poor decision at collective bargaining
sessions. As one participant stated, those who advocate this resolution
simply do not understand the difference between "selling a concession"
and buying it back." The point being that once a remedy is confined to
the bargaining table, a shift in the balance of power has occurred.
Where the issue determined by arbitration has been contested in collec-
tive bargaining negotiations and is of considerable importance to the
parties, recourse from the decision to the collective bargaining table is
"after the fact." Moreover, the standard of judicial review set forth by
the United States Supreme Court in the Enterprise Wheel case,97 namely
that the award is legitimate if it draws its essence from the collective
bargaining agreement, does not provide a safety valve. 5 If the standard
is applied literally, it indicates a limited chance for review.Y9 Con-
versely, the standard undermines the feasibility of limiting the grounds
for determination by contract because of the vagueness of the phrase
"draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement."'100 The
Arbitrability: A Question for the Supreme Court," 15 Syracuse L. Rev. 553 (1964); Note,
"Procedural Arbitrability Under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,"
73 Yale L.J. 1459 (1964). See Jones & Smith, "Report with Comments," 62 Mich. L.
Rev. 1115 n.2 (1964) for other articles dealing with procedural and substantive
arbitrability. For general discussion of judicial review of arbitration see Hays, op. cit.
supra note 91; Symposium--'Arbitration and the Courts," 58 N.W.U.L. Rev. 466 (1963).
Cf. Cornfield, "Developing Standards for Determining Arbitrability," 14 Lab. LJ. 564
(1964); Stone, "Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor: Some Reflections," 58 Mich. L.
Rev. 55 (1959). Compare Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action 295-304
(1965) (two-stage order of NLRB).
97 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, supra note 94.
98 United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, id. at 594. Cf.
"[T]he interrelationship between arbitrators, the courts, and the NLRB are somewhat
amorphous and not susceptible to precise delineation, and the law of the trilogy may
have the possible effect of blurring still further the shadowy demarcation lines that
presently exist." Aaron, "Arbitration in the Federal Courts: Aftermath of the Trilogy,"
9 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 360, 377 (1962).
99 But see Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645, 362 F.2d
677, 679-80 (1966) (question of authority of arbitrator under collective bargaining
agreement is subject to judicial review).
100 This phrase has not been defined by the United States Supreme Court. Compare
§ 10(e) "So far as necessary to decision and where presented the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning of applicability of the terms of any agency action .... " Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1958).
[Vol. 28
ARBITRATION AND THE NLRB
impact, therefore, is to confine preventative measures to selecting an
arbitrator who is not likely to shift the balance of power. This desire
is not without merit, but whether the selection process can accommodate
this goal is another question. The participants indicated that this
standard of review has an impact on the selection process."'
In summary the reasons given for the significance of the selection
process cannot be summarily disposed of as being entirely without
merit. Expertise and ability are important when applied to specific
problems and the handling of the dispute itself. "Award splitting" must
be analyzed so that hard feelings over losing a close case can be distin-
guished from intentional splitting. However, with today's minimal
knowledge of psychology it cannot be said that subconscious predilec-
tions which tend toward splitting do not exist. All that can be said is
that it is doubtful that intentional splitting exists. Whether the selection
process can reveal splitting is another question. While it is too late in the
game to yield to the notion that it is a management prerogative not to
accept unions, management and unions have excercised their prerogative
to select an arbitrator who will respect their own notions of the status
quo. Finally, regardless of the consideration of the propriety of judicial
review of arbitration in the legal process, the standard of review is an
existing factor in the selection process. The reasons given for concern
with the selection process are both objective and subjective. The need
to select the "right" arbitrator may be overstated, but it is justified as
difficult problems arise. Further, the process has merit to cull observably
bad performances. Subjectively the selection process provides the basis
of mutuality necessary for the parties to abide the "interference."
Moreover, selection, flexibility, and speed make arbitration a desirable,
as well as palatable, substitute for work stoppages and litigation.
As to the additional comments relating to the "advantage of delay"
and the use of the selection process to "impress clients," the former
will be considered in relation to the time lag in arbitration, and the
latter will be treated with the subtle question of why management
counsel were apparently more concerned with the selection process than
union counsel.
(b) The Distinction Between the Management Lawyer's and the
Union Lawyer's Approach to the Selection Process
The unanimity of response indicating that management lawyers
considered the selection process as the single most important factor
01 "[The subject of judicial review] ...seems to be a matter of genuine under-
standable concern to many who basically believe in arbitration." Jones & Smith,
supra note 96, at 1126-27.
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warrants prima facie acceptance. Management counsel documented
this claim by the devices they used to screen arbitrators. Some stated
that they kept an up-to-date file of arbiters comprised of past decisions,
hearsay, rumor, tips, and where possible their own experiences with
them. Others advised they used a service which is available evaluating
all experienced candidates.102 One participant stated that on submission
of a list, he read over the reported decisions of the included arbitrators
preferably dealing with the same issue or, if not available, analogous
problems. Several lawyers representing management admitted that
their clients had their own ideas. On the other hand, lawyers who
represent unions claimed that most of the arbitrators suggested by the
appointive agencies were qualified, and seemed to place little impor-
tance on a formal study of them. The significance of these opinions
is to indicate that there is an apparent difference between management
and union counsel regarding the importance to be placed on the selec-
tion of an arbitrator. This distinction in attitudes has been noted
elsewhere. 03 Yet, it would appear that if the concern for selection is
valid it should apply with equal force to either side.0 4
The participants indicated that management lawyers spend more
time researching the background of arbitrators than do union lawyers.
This assumption might be warranted on the findings of a recent survey
that indicates that lawyers fees charged management in arbitration
cases are substantially higher, on the average, than those charged
unions. 0 5 To assume, however, that this difference is due to time spent
evaluating arbitrators would be pure conjecture. The time spent in
research in itself does not prove a difference in union concern over
selection because the variation could be equally explained by a dif-
ference in approach to arbitration. 06 Further, assuming each side
102 What Mr. Saul Wallen referred to as a "private FBI" is at least two types
of services. Wallen, op. cit. supra note 88. One type of reporting service will send
out a dossier on arbitrators. Another type of operation works on a retainer to evaluate
panels sent out by the appointive agencies.
103 E.g., comment about acceptance of trainee arbitrators, i.e., "reaction [manage-
ment reluctance to accept] is believed to be representative of a reaction that may well
exist in other areas of the country." Committee on Training New Arbitrators, "Appendix
D Report to Membership 1964," in 1964. Proceeding NAA 324. See also Fleming, The
Labor Arbitration Process 209-11 (Ill. 1965).
104 Compare Fleming, id. at 35, "... it must be recognized that the mechanics of
the grievance procedure give companies and unions a somewhat different perspective
toward arbitration." Query, is this difference reflected in the selection of an arbitrator?
105 Id. at 46. "[Olne-third of the union lawyers charge less than $200 for the
average case. The average total fee for the union lawyers is $315. Although the average
company lawyer earns more than $700 in total fees from an average one-day hearing,
there is no great uniformity in charges."
106 See Fleming, id. at 35.
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views the process similarly, union structure is such that in many cases
other more economical and efficient methods of selecting an arbitrator
may be available. For example, information could be gathered by
arbitrators on a national rather than a local scale thereby spreading
the costs. °7 However, informal methods of obtaining information are
also available to union lawyers. °0 Probably, union business is con-
centrated in fewer law firms than management business. Therefore,
what management counsel accomplish by individual and more time
consuming work my be accomplished on a less formal basis by union
counsel. These less formal methods could logically be translated into
expressions of less concern, but the unions would still be protected
insofar as the selection process is concerned by the cohesive nature of
their structure and relationship with the lawyers who represent them.
This assumption of a difference in approach to selection, and the
arbitration process itself, is born out by historical and other opera-
tional factors. First, management's acceptance of the arbitral process
represents "an adjustment by management to the unions' point of
view."'1 9 The historicity indicates that management mistrusted the
process while unions' recent acceptance has not been begrudging.
Reluctance to engage in an activity carries with it a commensurate
care in the exercise of its use. This caution tends to explain manage-
ment's care in selection. Conversely, the union's nonchalance may be
explained by the "politics" of arbitration. It may be less burdensome
to have an arbitrator say "no" than having a union officer say "no" to a
member.110 Thus, the process may be used by the union to pass off an
undesirable decision to the arbiter. Even though Professor R. W.
Fleming indicates that a favorable decision may be of greater import
to the union than to the company because this will usually signify a
change in the status quo,"' the countervailing arguments are more
persuasive. A company will be unwilling to live with an adverse
decision which deals with a sensitive area." As indicated previously,
a change in the status quo may affect the balance of power."' Further,
107 Id. at 210. "Some international unions give advice to locals on the choice of
arbitrators, and on the management side manufacturers' associations, chambers of com-
merce, and private organizations often furnish information about arbitrators"
1os Ibid.
109 Management reluctant to arbitrate because it meant giving union status.
Slichter, Healy & Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management 745
(Brookings Inst. 1960).
110 See Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 35.
"'I Ibid.
112 Ibid.
118 Text at pp. 29-30 supra.
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use of the arbitration process is quite recent. Prior to 1930 there were
only a few voluntary agreements 14 indicating that management's
adjustment has been recent. Management reluctance and the newness of
the process mitigate against attributing a greater concern to unions.
Second, arbitration grew up as a private system and information about
the process was gathered independently. It was not until 1946 that the
first arbitration reports were published." 5 In addition to this fact,
management has traditionally been reluctant to engage in employer
associations where an exchange of information might have taken
place."" The picture until quite recently has been one of a sharp growth
of arbitration developing as a private system wherein the details of the
operation were not freely exchanged. In this process, however, there
has been a consistent contact by management with their lawyers. As
a matter of fact, management's use of counsel has been far greater than
that of unions.117 The complete filing system of arbitrators, described by
some of the participants, may well have been initiated by the private
nature of the process. Unions, on the other hand, have been more
centralized and not as adverse to exchanging information. One can logi-
cally conclude, therefore, that the approach to the process has been
different on the management side, and that lawyers representing them
would evolve a different system because of this.""
Once having shown that such a difference in approach to the
process does exist, it remains to be demonstrated that this distinction
does not indicate a lesser concern on the part of unions toward the
114 Sllchter, Healy & Livernash, op. cit. supra note 109, at 742.
115 "[T]he Bureau of National Affairs published its first volume of Labor Arbitra-
tion Reports (1946) designed as a 'systematic attempt ... to collect and classify awards
handed down by arbitrators." Id. at 747.
116 Even opposition to the Wagner Act by employer associations did not enlist
wholehearted support. Millis & Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 281-96
(1950).
117
Representation by Lawyers in Arbitration (FMCS Files)
Status of Rep. 1951-1952 1956-1957 1962-1963
No Counsel 21% 34% 40%
Both Had Counsel 31% 22% 32%
Only Company 36% 37% 25%
Only Union 12% 7% 3%
Total Cases-Company Represented 67% 59% 57%
Total Cases-Union Represented 43% 29% 35%
Fleming, "The Labor Arbitration Process: 1943-1963," 52 Ky. LJ. 817, 823 (1964).
118 Compare Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 78-106 for his theory of the effect
of "predictability in arbitration."
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selection process even though the role of the lawyer in the process may
be less formal and his statements indicate less concern. It has been
stated that one arbitrator may bring to bear greater expertise in a
specific problem than another, and at the same time may engender
greater confidence in the selecting parties. It follows, therefore, that
selection of the "right" arbitrator is significant to both parties and
does influence the process. One would have to demonstrate that unions
have less concern with the process of arbitration itself to indicate
less concern with the selection of an arbiter. It is impossible to
demonstrate that unions have less concern with the process. Although
the impact of the McClellan Committee hearings and the resultant
Landrum-Griffin amendments on the grievance procedure cannot be
measured," 9 there are undoubtedly pressures on unions which may
cause them to present more grievances, including some approached
indifferently, than they would previously have brought. 2  This does
not indicate total indifference to all cases. Nor does the fact that
variable patterns exist in the manner unions handle grievances prove
indifference. As one participant observed, unions react as quickly to
"interferences" as management does. Moreover, the volatile nature of
unions, as one observer remarked, and frequent elections may either
produce new leadership which feels a mandate to process more griev-
ances to arbitration; or, in the opposite situation, create a stable
mature leadership that is forced for campaign or political reasons to
present cases which they might under certain conditions resolve by
direct decisions.' 2 ' Finally, Professor Fleming's statement that "if the
union should be successful in the arbitration it may have gained a
substantial advantage, while if it loses it will be no worse off than it
was before"' 12 is relevant. As a matter of observation, the assumption
that unions are less concerned will not stand. Since it is pragmatically
119 See Cox & Bok, Labor Law Cases and Materials 915, 916 (6th ed. 1965). For
historical background see McAdams, Power and Politics in Organized Labor (1964);
Publishers Editorial Staff, The McClellan Committee Hearings (BNA 1957). For the
collateral problem of individual rights in the arbitration process, compare Cox, "Rights
Under a Labor Agreement," 69 Harv. L. Rev. 601 (1956) wuith Summers, "Individual
Rights in Collective Agreements and Arbitration," 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 362 (1962). See
generally Williams, "Intervention: Rights and Policies," in 1963 Proceedings NAA 266
(citations therein).
120 See Previant, "A Union Commentary on the Impact on Collective Bargaining of
Titles I through IV of the Landrum-Griffin Act," N.Y.U. 16th Ann. Conference on Lab.
157, 166-68 (1963).
121 See Murphy, "Panel Discussion on Arbitration," in N.Y.U. 17th Ann. Conference
on Lab. 437, 439 (BNA 1964). See also Slichter, Healy, & Livernash, op. cit. supra note
109, at 692-806 (noting variable patterns).
122 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 35.
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impossible to demonstrate lack of concern on the part of unions, the
apparent difference in attitudes must necessarily be attributed to a
difference in approach.
2. The Operation and Impact of the Selection Process
The primary objective of this investigation is to determine the
preferences of the participants and their effects. Therefore, a brief
discussion of how the attitudes discussed above affect the formal selec-
tion process is relevant. The formal process of selection and the duties
of the appointive agencies have been presented by other materials and
will not be reiterated here except to examine the impact of the pressures
and methods used by the parties. 23
The first step in the selection process of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) illustrates the factors that bear on the agency's
suggestions of arbitrators to the parties. In this step, on receiving the
demand for arbitration or a submission agreement, a staff member of
the regional office (under the regional manager's direction) acknowl-
edges receipt, and sends each party a copy of a specially prepared list
of proposed arbitrators limited only by the proviso that "he is to be
guided by the statement of the nature of the dispute."' 24 Under this
step the appointive agency formally controls the selection process
unless the parties provide otherwise in their agreement. 2 5 However,
three factors, other than the express proviso, have bearing on the
decision. First, the regional manager must consider the availability of
the arbitrators. At present it is sufficient to note that three of the
arbitrators interviewed admitted being "booked up" from two to four
months past the time of their interview, and also admitted having taken
cases further in advance than that period of time. Others stated that
they simply removed their names from the lists when they were
"booked" too far in advance, or where necessary to comply with their
other responsibilities. 2 The pressures of bookings necessarily affect
the agency's listings. Second, the Regional Manager, or his agent, must
also weigh the desirability of submitting "newly approved" or pre-
123 E.g., AAA, Labor Arbitration Procedures and Techniques (AAA-29-10I-5-66);
Jones & Smith, supra note 96, at 1132-40. (FMCS procedures). Note together the AAA
& FMCS comprised 44.1% of the sources of "ad hoc" arbitration in 1964. Including
selection by the parties the figure equals 86.6%. "1964 Survey," 1965 Proceedings NAA
251-52.
124 AAA, id. at 12.
125 "In their agreement to arbitrate, parties may provide for any method of
selecting an arbitrator." Ibid.
126 E.g., In 1962 42.1% of the professional time of arbitrators was spent in education.
"1962 Survey," 1964 Proceedings NAA 310.
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viously unselected arbiters to the parties in an attempt to distribute
the work and give experience to "new people.1127 This consideration
goes to the problem of encouraging "acceptability" which is thrust upon
the appointive agency. Third, the existence of previous patterhs of
selection by the parties is well known to the Regional Manager either
because of prior "cross outs" on submitted lists or through conversation
with the parties. Thus the selection pattern of the parties themselves
influences the submission of names in the first step.
Despite the importance attributed to the selection process, the
important question as to its affect on arbitration still remains. The
responses of the participants indicate the impact may be significant
and detrimental. Some explained that the pressures had resulted in an
insistence on a handful of arbitrators and a concomitant resistance to
new faces. 28 The combination of the past growth of the process and the
current pressures to push grievances to the arbitration stage,129 one
participant said, made it essential to introduce new people into arbitra-
tion and force their acceptability. Another summed up the underlying
tone of the participants when he stated that the figures bandied about
in regard to the speed of arbitration were a "myth," because they did
not take into consideration the delay caused in selecting the arbitrator.
3. The Caseload and Time Lag
Reference to the startling increase in arbitration is substantiated
by the fact that over the past ten years the incidence has increased on
the average of 10 percent per year. 30 If the figures cited as the "sources
127 During 1961-1963, FMCS added 168 new names to its roster (120 having little
or no experience). Jones & Smith, supra note 96, at 1134 n.24. The AAA indicated
younger men (5.1% under 40 yrs. of age) showed constant attempt to replenish. Coulson,
"Spring Checkup on Labor Arbitration," 16 Lab. L.J. 259, 262 (1965).
128 Of the 168 new names added to FMCS roster (1961-1963), 4097 panels (sug-
gested lists) sent out included one or more such names, and resulted in a total of 271
selections. Jones & Smith, ibid. A collateral problem involves the standards imposed on
arbitrators, see Fuller, "Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator," 1963 Wis. L. Rev. 3
(1963) (higher than a judge). It is noteworthy that in Boston area there are only two
professional arbitrators, i.e. Mr. Win. Fallon and Mr. Saul Wallen.
129 See Previant, supra note 120, at 168 (one multi-state agreement showed a two
and one-quarter increase since Landrum-Griffin).
130
Increase in Arbitration Cases by Agency
Year FMCS AAA
1948 647 Cases 1,330 Cases
1963 2,757 Cases 4,074 Cases
Increases +2,110 Cases (+311%) +2,744 Cases (+206%)
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of arbitration" by the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) are
correct, over 17,000 "ad hoc" arbitrations can be estimated to have
been held in 1964,'3M and "it has been ascertained that impartial chair-
men 'and permanent umpires have many more cases each year."' 32
To round out the statistical figures, it is significant to observe that of
the 1,400 names available for listing by the sixteen AAA regional
offices in 1964, only 370 rendered one or more AAA labor arbitration
awards. 83 During the three year period of 1959-61, 124 AAA arbi-
trators received their initial appointments.1 34 Of the 120 persons added
to FMCS panels from 1961-1963, with little or no previous experience,
33 acquired varying degrees of acceptability.135 Thus, the situation is
one of rapidly increasing arbitration with less than rapid acceptance of
new people.
The basic economics of supply and demand justifies empirical
research to determine the time lag resulting from these factors. There
have been attempts to statistically analyze this problem. 36 Unfortu-
nately, as Professor Fleming stated in his most recent study, "... the
existing surveys are not entirely additive." 37 The evidence available
does not appear to support the theory that the acknowledged increase
in time lag' 38 in the arbitration process is due to the selection process.'39
Figures compiled from "Panel Discussion on Arbitration," supra note 121, at 438.
See also Straus, "Charges Against and Challenges for Professional Arbitration," in 1964
Proceedings NAA 214, 216 (increase of 45% in caseload 1958-1963). The reasons stated
were: (1) increase in collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses; (2) long
term contracts; (3) unions pressing more grievances to avoid §,301 suits; (4) mechanical
innovations and automated equipment; (5) unemployment causing unions to fight for
jobs; (6) centralization of industrial relations within companies; and (7) volatile nature
of unions with frequent elections. 'Panel Discussion on Arbitration," supra at 439.
See generally Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, Ch. 1.
131 In 1964, the FMCS and AAA were noted to account for 44.1% of "ad hoc'
arbitrations, which by 1964 should have reached 7,514 between these two agencies. See
"1964 Survey," supra note 123 at 251, and figures in note 130 supra.
132 "Penal Discussion on Arbitration," supra note 121, at 438.
133 Coulson, supra note 127, at 262.
134 Jones & Smith, supra note 96, at 1133-34 n.22.
135 Id. at 1134 n.24.
136 E.g., Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 58-59; Ross, "The Well Aged Arbitration
Case," 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 262, 264 (1965); AAA Research Report, 'Trocedural
and Substantive Aspects of Labor-Management Arbitration" 12 ARE. J. (ns.) 67, 77
(1957).
137 Fleming, id. at 58.
138 Ross, supra note 136, at 262. "The labor arbitration process, at least, has become
much more time-consuming during the past decade."
139 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 58, chart 2. Overall time lag from 1945-1946
to 1963 increased 89% while average lapse of time from grievance to hearing during
same period increased only 67%.
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However, a sound argument can be advanced supporting this hypothesis.
Admitting that even where the figures used are comparable they can be
used to support contradictory observations, the following evidence
should be considered.
COMPARATIVE TIME LAG IN THE SELECTION PROCESS140
1954 AAA (1183 cases) 1964 NAA (2739 cases)
Percentage of cases Percentage of cases
completed-Grievance completed-Grievance
Thne Consumed to Decision to Hearing
Less than 2 months 23.61
Less than 3 months 55.3% 42.9%
Less than 4 months 73.6% -
Less than 6 months - 71.7%
First, with the caveat that these two sets of statistics are selected
from two different sources and are statistically incomparable, some
broad observations may be made. Professor Ross, in a 1957 report,
stated that his survey showed an increase in time lag between demand
or submission and hearing. 4 Professor Fleming acknowledged the
same trend in his recent book.142 There are indications that this
increase is more pronounced in areas other than discharge. 4 3 The
figures charted above demonstrate that although 73.6 percent of cases
were decided in 1954 within 4 months from date of submission, in 1964
only 71.7 percent went to hearing in less than 6 months. Professor
Fleming's comparision, although using two different sources also,
translates this into days. His statistics indicate that the average lapse
of time from demand to decision in 1954 was 97.5 days, while in 1963
the average lapse of time from demand to hearing was 81 days. 44
Taken together the two sets of figures tend to prove an increase in
time lag from demand to hearing. Note, there was a decrease of 12.4
140 Figures were compiled as follows: AAA Research Report, supra note 163, at 77,
table 13 was compared with "1964 Survey," supra note 123 at 253. The following variables
should be noted: (1) 1954 figures were compiled by AAA; (2) the 1964 figures were
compiled by NAA; (3) bases are not comparable and (4) there is no way of validating
samples. Compare Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at pp. 58-59 which supports hypothesis
using the same as well as different samples.
141 Ross, supra note 136, at 264-65 (he indicates 11.5% in 10 year period).
142 Fleming, op cit. supra note 103, at 58, chart 2. Average lapse of time from
grievance to hearing increased 11.8 days from 1945-46 period to 1955-56 period; and
55.3 days from 1955-1956 period to 1963.
143 Ross, supra note 136, at 264 (e.g., wage rate, job classification, and fringe
benefits).
144 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 58-59. Compare Chart 2 uith Chart 3.
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percent in cases heard within 3 months as compared to those decided in
the same time 10 years before. However these two sets of figures alone
would hardly prove the hypothesis.
Second, Professor Fleming states that figures drawn from 250
FMCS cases indicate that the average time lapse from grievance to
hearing in 1963 was 167 days.145 This period breaks down as follows:
86 days from grievance to demand; 30 days from demand to appoint-
ment; and 51 days from appointment to hearing. 146 He concludes that
"it is impossible to know how much of this time is attributable to the
parties and how much is due to the difficulty in finding an open date
on the arbitrator's calendar."'14 7 This begs the issue of how the arbi-
trator's calendar is affected by the selection process. 4 s According to the
participants interviewed, limited availability is largely due to the
parties. It is the selection process itself which narrows availability,
because the nub of the process is to focus on acceptable arbiters. It
follows that a process which is designed to limit "acceptable supply"
in face of increasing demand will create time lag pressures.
Third, there is some doubt in, regard to the average lapse of time
from hearing to decision. Professor Fleming compares Ross' 1945-1946
figures, derived from Labor Arbitration Reports, 49 with 1963 figures
drawn from the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 50 This
comparison supports the conclusion that the average lapse of time from
grievance to hearing was longer than the average lapse of time from
hearing to decision,'5' and this indicates the impact of the selection
process on time lag in arbitration. However, the comparision shows that
the increase in the time lag from hearing to decision has increased more
than the time lag from grievance to hearing percentage-wise. 5 2 The
latter tends to show that the overall increase of time lag in arbitration
is caused primarily by the decision making process. There are two
problems with this conclusion. In the first place, it should be noted that,
according to Professor Fleming's comparisons, the average number of
days in the pre-hearing time lag increased 67.1 during the ten year
period 53 On the other hand, the post-hearing time lag increased only
45.2 days during the same period. 54 The pre-hearing increase in time
145 Id. at 58, chart 2.
146 Id. at 59, chart 3.
147 Id. at 61.
148 Compare Fleming's concept of predictability. Id. at 78-106.
149 Ross, supra note 136, at 263.
150 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 103, at 58 n.4.
151 Compare Chart 2 with Chart 3, id. at 58-59.
152 Figures compiled from charts. Ibid.
153 Ibid.
154 Ibid.
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lag is more significant. Second, if one interpolates figures from other
sources, the results do not justify the same conclusion. For example,
comparing the NAA 1964 survey of post-hearing time lag with Ross'
1945-1946 figures tends to indicate little increase in time lag. According
to the NAA survey 58.2 percent of the cases were decided within 16-30
days." ' This is not inconsistent with the 27.8 day time lag from hearing
to decision shown by the Ross study." 6 This by no means proves that
Professor Fleming's conclusions are unfounded, but may indicate that
the figures supplied by different agencies are incomparable. The very
least that can be said of post-hearing time lag is that further empirical
study is warranted.
The argument that the selection process does influence time lag
in arbitration proceeds as follows: (1) the empirical evidence indicates
that the length of time necessary to get to the hearing stage from
demand has increased significantly; (2) the selection process has a
double-edged impact on time lag in that the parties can delay selection
and limit acceptability; and (3) the impact of the decision making
process (post-hearing) is subject to doubt. 5 7 This line of reasoning is
reinforced by the factors of growing caseload and stubborn resistance
to accepting new people as arbiters.
4. The Cost Factor
One of the participants contrasted this factor with an underlying
policy of the Wagner Act. When the Act was passed one of the con-
comitant advantages was to provide unions with a free forum to press
their charges. Due to concurrent policies favoring arbitration and
providing for court litigation, he said, the significance of this free forum
has been muted. Even though, he continued, this may not affect national
unions adversely, it is causing a financial squeeze on small locals who do
not receive funds for arbitration from their national organization. The
155 "1964 Survey," supra note 123, at 253.
156 Ross, supra note 136, at 264.
157 The short period from 1962-64 does indicate stability.
Percentage of Decisions Rendered from Appointment
Time 1962 (Cumulative) 1964 (Cumulative)
1-15 Days -
16-30 Days 74.8% 74.6%
31-60 Days 90.7% 92.3%
61-90 Days 95.07 95.70
Over 90 100.0% 100.0%
Figures compiled from "1964 Survey," supra note 123, at 253-54 and "1962 Survey,"
supra note 126, at 316.
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same may be said for small businesses by analogy. If the pressure to
grievances to the arbitration stage continues and if the NLRB and
courts continue to defer to arbitration, a substantial financial problem
may arise. Several arbitrators indicated that their fees were being paid
off in installments because they could not afford to pay them in a lump
sum.
How much does arbitration cost? A recent book appraising per
diem fees of arbitrators indicates that the percentage increase in the
average per diem fees is almost the same as the percentage rise in the
average hourly wages of production workers in manufacturing.' s
However, the author is quick to note other factors influencing the cost
to the parties, e.g. (1) counsel fees, (2) court reporter's fee, (3) time
spent in preparation of the grievance by both parties, (4) pay for lost
time while attending hearings, (5) charges for hotel conference rooms,
(6) service agency fees,' 59 (7) back pay awards, and (8) travel
expenses for the arbiter, counsel, and court reporter. 60 Professor
Fleming's figures based solely on the arbitrator, lawyers, and court
reporter's fee for a one day hearing show a cost of 640 dollars to the
union, and 1,025 dollars to the company.'61 Even a cursory examination
of the cost factors cited above justifies the conclusion that this estimate
of costs is inadequate. Moreover, Professor Fleming's figures indicate
that the average length of a hearing is 1.15 days, and the costs presented
are subject to multiplication. 62
Some cost savings can be achieved by the arbitrator himself, such
as knowledge of the problem (also one of the criteria in the selection
process) ,163 avoidance of "obiter dicta,""16" and a sliding fee scale based
on experience. 6 An unduly broad opinion may result in a backlash
problem that will necessitate further expenses to the parties in "unsolv-
ing" what was solved, not to mention the resultant exacerbation of
feelings. However, most of the possible cost savings can be accom-
plished by the parties themselves, such as: not requiring a written
opinion, not ordering needless transcripts, checking into the arbitrator's
158 Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 38 (Ill. 1965).
159 Administrative expense includes fees paid to appointive agency, and sometimes
includes additional expense for subsequent hearings. AAA op. cit. supra note 123, at 22.
160 Fleming, op. cit. supra note 158, at 50.
161 Ibid.
162 Id. at 40. FMCS tabulations for all cases in 1962 indicates discharge hearing is
comparable in length to all cases according to Professor R. W. Fleming.
163 AAA, 9 Ways to Cut Arbitration Costs (McGraw & Hill 1959).
164 "Editorial-The Hazards of Dicta in Labor Arbitration," 19 Arb. J. (ns.) 68
(1964).
165 Fleming, oP. cit. supra note 158, at 53.
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per diem charge in advance, using state agencies where they are
effective, stipulating as many facts as possible before the hearing
starts, avoiding indiscriminate citations, avoiding futile fights about
arbitrability, avoiding unnecessary postponements and cancellations,
better preparation of cases, and watching "back pay" matters. 66 The
parties control the overall cost factor to an appreciable degree as the
above propositions indicate. However, the effect of the cost on arbitra-
tion process cannot be minimized.
5. Summary
A recapitulation of the participants' evaluation of the "ad hoc"
arbitral process indicates that they believe it to be desirable because
of the objective factors of flexibility and speed, and the subjective
aspect of the opportunity to control their own affairs. Control over
the process itself (as opposed to the substance of the dispute) stems
from the selection process. Both unions and management, and their
lawyers to varying degrees, are concerned with the selection process
even though they may approach it in different ways. However, this
concern evidenced by the selection of an arbitrator has had a profound
affect on the time lag in the last ten years. This impact has been
intensified by a dramatic increase in the caseload and a continued
resistance to new arbiters. In addition to this spiraling effect of "control,"
the cost factor (although not precisely delineated by empirical study)
may also be attributed as a problem to the parties. The rising cost
of the process multiplied by an ever-increasing caseload may pose
difficulties for small businesses and small unions alike. The participants
acknowledged that the process it not without its inherent problems,
and use of the process should not ignore these difficulties.
B. The National Labor Relations Board
Since the approach taken to the problem of the interrelationship of
arbitration and NLRB adjudication is to analyze the institutional
processes of each, this study is not truly comparative. However, some
comparison is inevitable. Where comparison exists it derives from the
form of the study rather than any concept that the two forums are
interchangeable. As one participant indicated the two forums are not
comparable because they are not alternative. Nonetheless, he went on
to comment that arbitration grows out of an existing relationship, is
more expeditious, less inflammatory, and presents a better chance of
166 See Colin, "One Way to Reduce the Cost of Arbitration," 10 Lab. LJ. 611 (1959)
(pre-trial stipulation procedure); Editorial, "Controlling Costs in Arbitration," 14 Arb.
J. 1, 28 (1959) (small claims arbitration).
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receiving justice since its rules are more flexible than the Board's. He
also indicated that the Board does not understand the problems that
arise out of going relationships. There were other comments to the
effect that the NLRB was overburdened and prone to shifting political
commitments that were improper for a quasi-judicial body. One
participant stated that after thirty years the Board had still failed to
resolve the basic issues that confronted it at the beginning, and that
some of these problems should have been resolved in this period of
time. The major recurring comments centered around three complaints:
(1) a charge that the Board was "too political," (2) a complaint that
the NLRB's operation was rigid, and (3) allegations of intolerable
delay. Each accusation warrants consideration.
1. The "Political Factor"
Even though evaluation of the NLRB by this study is predicated
on process rather than politics, 16 7 the "political factor" requires further
comment because of its impact on the process. The responses from the
participants indicate their use of the process was influenced by the
"political bias" of the Board. Allegations of political bias are subject
to the infirmity of obscurity and for this reason the phrase "political
factor" will be used to denote the many implications. One participant
suggested that the comments had a twofold thrust; first, that the
Board members themselves were constantly accused of being pro-labor
or pro-management depending on the President who appointed them,16
and second, that the NLRB process was challenged as inappropriate
for an institution which was beholden to Congress and/or the Presi-
dent.1 69 Whether or not this simple division is logically defensible, it
presents a point of departure from the morass.
In considering complaints that Board Members are pro one side or
the other, one initial distinction should be made. As member Brown
said, "to ask if the Board is pro-union or pro-management is not only
meaningless but is simply the wrong question.., the Act expresses an
initial policy and imposes some restrictions on both parties...." 70 The
167 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
168 Compare statements to the effect that unions' dissatisfied with political status
and ready to take different political role. See 61 LRR 41 (1966); 61 LRR. 190 (1966).
169 But see "Politics is now rightly viewed not only as unavoidable, but as essential
to the formulation of policies that bear some rational relation to economic and techno-
logical conditions." Bernstein, "The Regulatory Process: A Framework for Analysis,"
26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 329, 341 (1961).
170 Brown, "An Administrative Agency in a Changing World," Address to National
Labor Relations Board Conference at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo., on Jan. 29,
1964 reported in 55 LRRM 93, 98.
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issue involved is not the predilection of a particular Board member,
but whether or not this "bias" has an affect on the manner in which he
effectuates statutory policy. Even a severe critic of the "Kennedy
Board" admitted that, "criticism... both of the Board's approach to
decision-making and of its decisions, must not be construed as an attack
upon its members. They are not unique."'171 If the "political factor"
has any significance at all, the relevance must pertain to the manner in
which Board members conduct their activities and not to the individuals
themselves. Three types of activities are available to make a determina-
tion-speech making, rule making, and adjudication.
(a) Speech Making and the "Political Foot"
The reason that this is included within the topic of the "political
factor" is because of the discussions of the political nature of the Board
that are a reaction to speeches. For example, in 1962 Board Member
Leedom stated,
undoubtedly the very dynamics of industrial relations and the in-
tensity of feeling that has historically accompanied organized labor's
struggle to a place of influence in our economy, have led honest
men throughout the history of the Board to depart too readily
from sound judicial approach in an effort to right horrendous
decisions politically induced, as they believed. Inevitably the labor
views of the incumbent Board, as with all prior Boards reflect,
at least to a degree, the economic and philosophical views of its
members, which are largely the predilections of the individual
members' various experiences in life. (Emphasis added.)1 72
A comparison of Member Leedom's statement and the second para-
graph of Mr. McGuiness' book criticizing the "Kennedy Board" is
self-explanatory, that is, "few informed observers would take exception
to the view that the NLRB has been an agency where the interpreta-
tions of the law have been peculiarly dependent on the predilections of
its members."'73 (Emphasis added.) Even though the Board has been
a storm center since its creation, 74 Secretary Wirtz gave warning of
171 McGinnis, The New Frontier NLRB 10 (1963).
172 Leedom, "Recent Decisions and Changes at the NLRB," Address before the
Labor Law Section of the Illinois State Bar Association in Chicago, Ill. on Jan. 19, 1962
reported in 49 LRRM 84, 85.
173 McGinnis, op. cit. supra note 171, at 1.
174 For a discussion of criticisms of the "Madden Board" (1935-1940), see Millis &
Brown, From the Wagner Act to Taft-Hartley 243-46 (1950) ; the "Millis Board" (1940-
1945), supra at 40-60; the "Herzog Board" (1945-1947), supra at 60-66; the "Truman
Board" (1947-1952), "The NLRB, It's Past, Present and Future," 23 Tenn. L. Rev. 112
(1594); the "Eisenhower Board" (1952-59), Note, "The National Labor Relations Act
Under a Republican Administration: Recent Trends and Political Implications," 55
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such statements twelve years ago when he said "regardless of words, the
serving notice that the meaning of federal labor law depends upon which
party won the last election will inevitably diminish the influence of the
law.'175 The fact that Member Leedom's statement may have meant
that one's attitudes inevitably influence one's approach while Mr.
McGuiness concluded that members' attitudes may have influenced the
decisions does not preclude the analysis that both have given lip service
to the impact of the "political factor," and to Secretary Wirtz' admoni-
tion. Moreover, there are independent reasons why such speeches are
undesirable. Frequent appearances away from a crowded docket have
given rise to criticism that such activity is too time consuming.
7 6
Defenses of Board positions impair the dignity of its members. 77
Perhaps the most significant reason speech making is undesirable arises
out of the judicial nature of the members' positions. Speeches involving
abstract issues appear different when applied, and they are easily mis-
understood by the audience. One participant commented that speeches
by Board members are totally unreliable even though they may portend
authority. They give vent to the criticism that the NLRB "shifts with
the tide." What is more important, they involve the personal attitudes
of Board members with the process itself so that personal opinion and
official activity become intertwined. As another participant wryly said,
one of the Board Members is always putting his "political foot" in his
mouth. The speeches concerning rule making and adjudication become
an extension of the process, and because of this involve the members
more deeply in the "political factor."
(b) Rule Making, Adjudication, and Politics
The rule making authority is given to the Board by statute and has
been traditionally exercised by the issuance of "Rules and Regulations"
published in the Federal Register (which normally concerns procedures
Colum. L. Rev. 852 (1955); Wirtz, "Board Policy and Labor-Management Relations-
Employer Persuasion," N.Y.U. 7th Ann. Conference on Lab. 79 (1954); the "Kennedy
Board" compare McGinnis, op. cit. supra note 171 with Grodin, "The Kennedy Labor
Board," 3 Ind. Rel. 33 (1963). See generally Millis & Brown, op. cit. supra at 32-33, (the
reasons for criticism (1) novelty of problems, (2) continuing opposition in industry and
Congress, (3) division of labor movement, and (4) normal conditions of defense, war
and postwar periods).
175 Wirtz, supra note 174, at pp. 107-108.
176 See Morse, "Perversion of the Taft-Hartley Act by the Eisenhower National
Relations Board-A Call for Congressional Invstigation," Speech in the Senate of the
United States, Mar. 23, 1956 at p. 21 reprinted by U.S. Gov't Printing Office (1956)
(speechmaking versus case handling by General Counsel).
177 Wollett, "The Performance of the National Labor Relations Board-A Clinical
View," N.Y.U. 16th Ann. Conference on Lab. 193, 196 (1963).
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to be followed by the charging parties) as well as by adjudication of
cases.178 Those who advocate that the Board should determine the
substantive rules by adjudication, comprising most of the board chair-
men, argue that the "multiple of variant fact patterns in which the
Board must determine such matters as the appropriate unit and extent
of bargaining in good faith are better adapted to adjudication."' 9 The
proponents of the regulation-by-hearing method admit that some
matters are better limited to case-by-case handling, but state that rules
of broad application are not. Futher, they believe that "rule making"
under the Administrative Procedure Act protects the parties from the
injustice of retroactivity, and increases predictability while at the same
time providing a hearing.8 0 The relative merits of each position are
beyond the scope of this paper. However, the relationship of the dispute
to the "political factor" is relevant. Reaction to this dispute indicates a
widespread belief that this problem is politically oriented. An historical
incident involving rule making versus adjudication will serve to
illustrate this attitude.
In January of 1954, when for the first time the majority of the
Board members were Republican, Chairman Guy Farmer made a speech
in which he advocated gradual withdrawal of the NLRB from local
disputes.""' Member Rodgers made a similar statement in a speech two
months later.'82 In July of the same year the Board, by issuing two
releases, 8 3 announced new jurisdictional rules which it applied in the
178 Section 4(a) "General notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the
Federal Register. .... " Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
1003(a). For a discussion of how Board Rules are effectuated see Forkosch, Treatise on
Labor Law §§ 295-303, pp. 534-59 (2d ed. 1965).
179 McCulloch, "Ruemaking by the National Labor Relations Board," address before
the Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association in the fall of 1964 reported in
56 LRRM 31. See also Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies-The Need for
Better Definition of Standards 36 (1962). But see Shapiro, "The Choice of Rulemaking
or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative Policy," 78 Harv. L. Rev. 921, 972
(1965) (may be exaggerated issue).
180 E.g., dispute between Labor Law Section of ABA and Board regarding contract
bar rules. See 46 LRRM 40 (Board should reconsider views on establishing contract bar
rules by case); 53 LRRM 51 (1963) (new contract bar rules violate APA § 10(e)); 56
LRRM 31 (1964) (contract bar rules by case have retroactive effect); ABA Sec. Lab. Law,
in 1964 Proceedings 314 (1964) (use of APA rulemaking requirements not recommended).
181 Speech by Board Chairman Guy Farmer before joint conference of the Industrial
Relations Committee of Edison Electric Institute, New Orleans, La. on Jan. 21, 1954
reported in Morse, op. cit. supra note 176, at 25.
182 Speech by making Rodgers before the American Bar Association at Atlanta, Ga.
on Mar. 15, 1954. Ibid.
183 Press release, "N.L.R.B. Announces Changes in Standards for its Exercises of
Jurisdiction." National Labor Relations Board Press Release No. 445, July 11, 1954;
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Breeding Transfer case' three months later. This series of events
brought forth a vitriolic speech by Senator Wayne Morse calling for
a congressional investigation of the "Eisenhower Board."'85 Senator
Morse stated in this speech that,
It seems perfectly plain that an administrative policy, such as
the Board's new restrictive standards on jurisdiction, which finds its
genesis in a purely political program; which is designed to evoke
an amendment of the act, not enforcement of the statutory policy
as it stands; and which subverts, rather than effectuates, the act's
patent objectives, is a usurpation of Congress' province, not the
performance of administratively [sic] responsibility. (Emphasis
added.) 188
It is of no little significance that Senator Morse stated that the apparent
desired change of statutory policy (to cede jurisdiction to State Courts)
should be accomplished by Congress, as it was, and not by "packing"
the Board. 87 The basis of Senator Morse's comments and the minority
dissent from the Breeding Transfer case' 88 which he cited,189 were in-
formal pronouncements of Board members. The fact that prior Boards
had also been troubled by the same problem of jurisdictional standards
did not forestall the criticism of "political bias" in this instance.' The
heart of his complaint went "to the relationship between Congress and
those who are responsible for effectuating its policies."' 1 The "political
program" was that of the executive. The dispute, therefore, was not
whether there should be a "political program," but rather whose pro-
gram should be applied. One social scientist theorized that "politics is
now rightly viewed as not only unavoidable, but an essential to the
formulation of policies that bear some rational relations to economic
and technological conditions."' 92 Whether or not one agrees with this
philosophy, it must be recognized that allegations of "political bias"
"N.L.R.B. Announces New Standards for Exercise of Jurisdiction," National Labor
Relations Board Press Release No. 449, July 15, 1954." Breeding Transfer Co., 110
N.L.R.B. 493, 500 n.6 (1954). See 53 LRRM 51 (Board also ignored own rules in making
releases).
184 Breeding Transfer Co., id.
185 Morse, op. cit. supra note 176, at 26.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Breeding Transfer Co., supra note 183, at 502.
189 Morse, op. cit. supra note 176, at 25. Compare Senator Morse's speech, supra,
with Member Murdock's dissent, Breeding Transfer Co., id. at 502-503.
190 See Millis & Brown, op. cit. supra note 174, at 243-46.
191 "[T]he clash [Board and critics] poses issues which go to the heart of the
relationship between Congress and those who are responsible for effectuating its
policies. .. ." Pucinski Report 65.
192 Bernstein, supra note 169, at 331.
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may go to the question of separation of powers and not to the concept
that the Board should be apolitical. 93 The "political factor" in this
sense depends upon traditional notions of control of agency, and not
upon the predilections of its members. As stated before, 194 this study is
concerned with the question of whether the Board process, as part of
the political process, can achieve its desired ends. The question still
remains whether this dispute over approach affects Board process.
Impact may be analyzed by looking at the Board process from the
standpoint of the parties who are on the receiving end of the rules
promulgated. The argument can be advanced that this focus is wrong.
Perhaps the actions of the Board should be analyzed at the point of
contact. The participants were not hesitant in expressing their attitudes.
One stated that the lack of continuity of Board decisions was so pro-
nounced that an attorney could not advise his client as to the current
status of the law with conviction. 9 ' Another told of inexperienced orga-
nizers and employees who had relied upon prior Board decisions only to
their detriment when precedent was reversed. One of the participants
added that not only was precedent reversed, but inconsistently applied.
These comments go to consistency and reliance. The "political factor"
relates to when changes in rules (made by the rule making process or
adjudication) occur. The consensus of the participants was that there
has been changing precedent commensurate with political shifts.
Furthermore, there is strong argument from pro-union, pro-manage-
ment, and neutral observers to the same effect. 96 Assuming that politi-
cal shifts have evoked changes, the issue still remains as to how this
shifting has affected the preferences of the parties. One answer to this
question is that stare decisis is desirable, if not an inexorable command,
because it affords predictability. Judge Friendly stated it in terms of
the need for a better definition of standards, in his Holmes Lectures,
because: (1) of the basic need that the law should provide like
193 Miller, "Malaise in the Administrative Scheme: Some Observations on judge
Friendly's Call for Better Definition of Standards," 9 How. L.J. 68, 72 (1963) (attempt
to depoliticise agencies would founder on shoals of politics it seeks to eliminate).
194 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
195 See Hills, "A Close Look at Three Administrative Policies," 3 Ind. Rec. 5, 13
(1964). "The criticism stands. The present Board ("Kennedy") has shown little or no
consideration for the valid premises of stare decisis and as a result there is considerably
more uncertainty, litigation, and cynicism concerning our federal labor laws. There are
also charges of union bias, which seem to me less valid." (Emphasis added.)
196 Compare Ratner, "The Quasi-Judicial NLRB Revisited," 12 Lab. L.J. 685, 689
(1961) (NLRB not arm of administration but of Congress) with Grodin, supra note 174,
at 34 (may be inaccurate to call "Eisenhower Board" pro-employer but it did create
more favorable atmosphere), and McGinnis, op. cit. supra note 171, at 26 ("Kennedy
Board" determined to make own policy).
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treatment under like circumstances, (2) of the social value in protecting
the security of transactions, (3) of the need for a clear statement of
standards, (4) of the necessity of maintaining the independence of
agencies whose influence diminishes when vague standards exist, and
(5) of the intra-agency advantage of reducing cases where certainty
exists.197 Each of these reasons provides a strong argument for the
need to delineate standards, but the relationship of vague standards and
increasing caseload requires further comment.
The participants analyzed increasing caseload in diverse ways.
Some indicated that it was due to insecurity arising from vagueness.
Others said that it was a sign of disrespect for the agency. Yet some
responses indicated that the increase in caseload showed increasing re-
liance on the process. Most acknowledged the influence of other factors
such as changing technology, the impact of unemployment, and weak
enforcement of the decisions of the Board. Each of these reasons may
be valid, but they fail to establish the causal nature of vague standards.
Perhaps an overall evaluation of these diverse attitudes is possible by
examining the problem in its labor relations context. As one participant
saw the conflict, if the Board rulings mean that employers should en-
courage or want unions, they are ridiculous-this is a battle of contain-
ment. In labor relations the stakes of winning are high, and the tactics
of the individuals involved have always reflected awareness of this
fact. Carl Stevens, in his provocative book, Strategy and Collective
Bargaining Negotiations, calls attention to the ambivalence in the re-
lationship between unions and employers as being one of competition
and cooperation. 198 Although the community may expect cooperation
between the contestants, changing precedent presents an opportunity
for resistance and use of the process a competitive tactic or what Pro-
fessor Stevens refers to as a "move."' 9 The traditional approval of
lawyers of the doctrine of stare decisis and precise standards does not
indicate that they would not (or should not) use legal opportunities
when they are available. The impact of such use is obvious. Whether or
not flexibility and direction obtained through the political nature of the
process is desirable, the use of the institution by the parties to their
advantage must be weighed. 00 If such "moves" provide the contestants
with abundant opportunity for abuse of process rather than a forum
'97 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies, The Need for Better Definition
of Standards 19-24 (1962).
198 Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiation 2 n.5 (1963).
199 Ibid.
200 See S. Rep. No. 168, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1961), suggesting lengthening terms
of Agency members.
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which contributes to industrial peace, then the criticisms are valid
politics notwithstanding. Accordingly the use and nature of the process
should be examined.
2. Bureaucratic Structure and Process
The responses of the participants were rife with complaints about
structure and process. A frequent allegation heard was that the NLRB
was "top heavy," and use of its process futile. One participant said that
by the time you could find out about a rule it was changed. He stated that
the entire procedure was "enshrouded by red tape." Another suggested
that the mechanistics of the Board had to be bureaucratic because the
personnel were young, inexperienced, and prosecutorial necessitating
levels of supervision and rules. Others suggested that the parties lost
control of the action once it had commenced. They used as an example
the fact that a charging party only had the right to an investigation and
not a formal hearing;210 and that once a charge was filed, the parties
did not control the action in the same sense that they did in arbitration
(or litigation). When the suggestion was made that the incidence of
settlements and withdrawals in unfair labor practice cases did not
indicate loss of control, 02 the response was that settlements were indica-
tive of bureaucratic pressure. The nature of the settlements was said
to prove the existence of this pressure. The constraint to hold down the
caseload before the Board was charged to the Office of the General
Counsel (OGC). A further complaint was that the "so-called adminis-
trative advantage of informal hearings was a myth," because the rules
of evidence applied by the Trial Examiner were "medieval." Moreover,
exceptions to the Trial Examiner's decisions were viewed by Board
Members through the "prismatic lense" of their assistants who had
virtually no experience in the field. Appeal from "bad decisions" was
costly thus putting more pressure to settle on the parties. Several
participants indicated that even when a remedy was provided, it was
often ineffective. Prior to any discussion of these allegations, it is
necessary to consider the inter-relationship of the various divisions of
the NLRB.
A rough outline of the NLRB organization is sufficient to enable
a comprehension of the basic relationships of the divisions. The Taft
Hartley amendments created the independent Office of the General
201 Rules and Regs, § 101.6: "The regional director thereupon [after investigation]
informs the parties of his action ...and the complainant of his right to appeal to the
general counsel in Washington, D.C., within 10 days."
202 See Rules and Regs, § 101.9(a): "Even though formal proceedings have begun,
the parties again have full opportunity at every stage to dispose of the case by amicable
adjustment and in compliance with the law."
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Counsel20 (including Division of Litigation, Division of Operations,
and Division of Administration) 204 who is appointed by the President for
a four-year term with the advice and consent of the Senate; and who
now controls the Regional Offices through the Division of Operations.20 5
The General Counsel has authority over the investigation of charges,
the issuance of complaints, and case presentation before the Board.
The Board is comprised of the five members who are also appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate for staggered
five-year terms who have control over their own staffs and divisions.20 6
The Board has authority to make, amend, and rescind such rules and
regulations as necessary to carry out the provisions of the Act. 20 7 It also
has authority to establish regional agencies, appoint regional directors,
and regional attorneys even though this personnel is under the super-
vision of the OGC.208 Furthermore, the Board under the Landrum-
Griffin amendments was given power to delegate certain authority, in-
cluding representational elections, to the Regional Offices.209 Each
regional office is headed by a director (supervisor), and is assisted by
the regional attorney (law officer), and an assistant to the regional
director (investigating and processing officer). The field examiners are
203 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(d), 154.
204 Division of litigation includes: Supreme Court Branch and Appellate Branch;
Legal Research and Special Projects Branch and District Court Branch; and Office of
Appeals. Division of Operations includes: Regional Advice Branch and Time and
Performance Branch; Regional Case-Handling Branch and Administrative Services Branch;
and Regional Offices. Division of Administration includes: Budget and Finance Branch
and Personnel Branch; and Organization & Methods Branch; Statistical Analysis Branch;
General Services Branch; and Library. National Lab. Rel. Org. & Methods Branch,
National Labor Relations Board Organization Chart (6PO 873-601 1963).
205 Purpose was to centralize responsibility for Regional Office operation. See H.R.
Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1949); Pucinski Report 31-34.
206 National Labor Relations Act § 3(b)-6, 49 Stat. (1935), as amended 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 153(b)-156. Board includes: Legal Assistants, and Office of the
Solicitor; and has control over Office of Executive Secretary, Office of Representation
Appeals, Division of Information, Division of Trial Examiners (Branch Office San Fran-
cisco). National Lab. Rel. Org. & Methods Branch, op cit. supra note 204.
207 National Labor Relations Act § 3(b)-6, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61
Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 153(b)-156.
208 National Labor Relations Act § 4(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. 154(a).
209 Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 §§ 3(b), (c), (e), 61 Stat. 136, as
amended 73 Stat. 519 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 153(b),(c), (e). In representation cases, the
31 Regional Directors have had authority (since May 15, 1961) to process all petitions,
rule on contested issues and direct elections or dismiss the request subject to review by
the Board members on limited grounds. Rules and Regs. §§ 101.17-101.21. See also
jurisdictional Dispute Cases under Sec. 10(b) of the Act, Rules and Regs, §§ 101.31-101.36.
See generally 48 LRRM 85.
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appointed by the regional office, 210 and should be distinguished from
trial examiners who, although nominally a division of the Board, are
civil service employees and are appointed for specific hearings by the
Division of Trial Examiners.211
The allegations of "bureaucratic red tape" actually encompassed
every stage of the process, and for the sake of simplicity, treatment of
the NLRB process will be by stage.
(a) The Regional Office
The channels of activity at the regional office are expressly gov-
erned by the "Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure"
(published in the Federal Register) ,2 12 and the "National Labor Re-
lations Board Case Handling Manual" (a confidential document re-
lating to the internal management of the agency) which provides that
adherence to its rules is compulsory on agency personnel.21 3 Since the
"Rules and Regulations" are published but the "Case Handling
Manual" is not, a description of the operation of the latter on the
process is of interest. In general the manual details procedures and sets
up channels of activity. For example, it provides how a charge when
received is assigned for investigation, and the relationship of the field
examiner to his superior in preparing a "final investigation report"
(FIR). 214 It details the new requirement that the FIR, together with
210 In the Boston Regional Office, field examiners are lawyers, and are often assigned
as trial attorneys on the cases they have investigated. There is a strict separation of
functions maintained in representation cases between field examiners and hearing officers
who are selected from agency personnel.
211 Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1947), s U.S.C. 1010 (1958).
National Labor Relations Board Trial Examiners have a civil service rating of GS-16
(salary range $18,935 to $24,175). Specific requirements for appointment in this field are:
2 years experience in preparation, presentation, hearing of formal cases, making decisions
of record originating before governmental regulatory bodies (federal or state level) arising
in field of labor law; passing grade on examination. Announcement No. 318, Hearing
Examiner 2, 18, 21 (U.S. Gov't Printing 1965).
212 Administrative Procedure Act § 3(a), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. 1003(a)
(requires publication).
213 Query: what effect will the new act to amend sec. 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act insofar as public access to government information is concerned. The Act
becomes effective July 4, 1967. Pub. L. No. 89-437, 80 Stat. 250, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 3(a) (July 4, 1966).
214 The operation of field examiners within the Regional Offices was a point of
criticism by the participants who alleged inexperience due to turnover, and the combina-
tion of field examiner-prosecutor to be undesirable. See General Counsel Ordman's
statement that NLRB was graduate school for labor relations lawyers, 61 LRR 98 (1966).
However, practice of raiding government agencies by private parties is well known, and
criticism by parties should be directed to the source of the problem rather than agencies.
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affidavits and other materials, be handled by a tripartite committee
(Regional Director, Regional Attorney, and Assistant to the Regional
Director) to determine what action should be taken on the charge.
Previously this matter was handled by the Regional Director (who still
has sole responsibility for the issuance of a complaint) in any manner
that he thought best. The committee is given instructions as to the manner
and criteria for settlement, dismissal, or amending the charge. Further,
the committee is to determine whether the charge has "merit" and a com-
plaint should issue, but the only criteria mentioned is the obvious one
of establishing a "prima facie" case. If "merit" is found, the manual
provides that the Regional Attorney should assign the case for hearing
to a trial lawyer who assists the general counsel who receives the case.
Criteria are outlined for informal settlements (including non-admission
clauses) at this stage, and so on. The confidential manual would seem
to vest a large area of discretion with the committee, but this is de-
ceptive. The manual contains a detailed list of situations where it is
mandatory for the regional director to consult the "Regional Advice
Branch" of the Division of Operations which is under the supervision
of the OGC. "ADVICE" is to be consulted on matters of national im-
portance, where wide-spread publicity may be involved, or where novel
questions are presented. Moreover, the regional director is to forward
all charges where "hot issues" such as secondary boycotts, picketing,
and "hot cargo" problems exist. The regional office must also consult
on settlements, as well as complaints, in regard to these issues. Further,
non-compliance with prior orders, or unusual remedies (subpoenas and
discretionary injunctions), even though unconnected with the above
listed issues, must also be submitted. Since the situations detailed for
referral constitute the heart of the Act, the OGC demonstrably can be
shown to have an important voice in the operation. In addition to the
express provisions contained in the "NLRB Case Handling Manual"
and the policy decisions made by "ADVICE", there are indirect pres-
sures which affect the operation of regional offices.
In 1958 the NLRB contracted with McKinsey & Co., Inc., a
management consultant firm, for an evaluation of its organization and
administration. The report 15 was severely critical of the lack of
efficiency in the operation of the NLRB. The significance of this report
cannot be evaluated quantitatively, but from 1959, when Stuart
Rothman was appointed as General Counsel, 216 an era of efficiency
No figures were available as to the combination of functions (investigatory and prosecu-
torial), but practice is based on exigency and bears further study.
215 Reprinted in full in Pucinski Report 1619-1724.
216 Mr. Rothman was appointed June 20, 1959.
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(appropriately called "target consciousness") has developed.21 An
example of the use of "target dates" was the unilateral announcement to
the regional offices that field examiners were to meet a thirty-day dead-
line in investigations.218 The ever-present pressure to reduce the mount-
ing caseload must also be added to "target consciousness" as an indirect
pressure on regional offices. 219 However, in evaluating the direct and
indirect pressures, several countervailing factors should be mentioned.
The McKinsey evaluation did indicate serious duplication and ineffi-
ciency existed in regional offices, 220 and the drive toward efficiency has
had a corrective influence.2 21 Further, in 1961 the Board delegated the
decision-making authority in representation cases, among other things,
with permission of Congress; and this has resulted in cutting in half the
processing period of petitions as well as relieving Board members of
this work.22  Finally, the present relationship between the regional
offices and the OGC cannot be said to deprive the regional offices of all
discretion in handling cases. The fact that under the current rules
appeals from a regional director's decision as to the disposition of a
charge may be taken only to the Office of the General Counsel was
subject to comment by the participants. The basis for this rule was the
desire to place the regional offices under an Independent Office of the
General Counsel. 23
217 See Rothman, "Some Law and Practice Problems Before the Office of the General
Counsel," N.Y.U. 14th Ann. Conference on Lab. 163, 166 (1961) (development and utiliza-
tion of procedures designed to achieve dispatch); Rothman, "In Search of Helping the
Administration of the National Labor Relations Act," address before Fifteenth Annual
Fall Industrial Conference of the Associated Industries of Cleveland, Ohio on Oct. 20, 1962
reported in 51 LRRM 79. See also ABA Sec. Lab. Law, 1965 Proceedings 387 (1965)
(problems existing in rigid application of "target dates").
218 A collateral question that should be investigated is the relationship between the
quality of the varied types of investigation and the speed required by "target dates."
219 Recognition of this relationship is indicated in 30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 11 (1965)
"With increased workload on NLRB regional offices r sulting from the higher number of
unfair labor practice cases filed, and the increased number found to have merit, the median
time in fiscal 1965 from filing of charges to complaint issuance was 59 days. Median time
in fiscal 1964 was 56 days."
220 Pucinski Report 1636-1701.
221 See General Counsel Ordman's testimony before the House Special Labor Sub-
committee on Feb. 14, 1966 reported in 61 LRR 97.
222 See 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 16-18 (1964). Average time cut from 89 days in 1961 to
39 days in 1964, supra at 17.
223 See Pucinski Report 1656-57. In 1964 the ABA's Labor Law Section came out in
opposition to changing this procedure because: (1) it would undermine existing statutory
separation of powers, (2) there was no evidence that OGC not living up to its responsi-
bility, (3) internal review procedure sufficient, and (4) it would increase Board's stagger-
ing work load. ABA Sec. Lab. Law, op. cit. supra note 180, at 325-30.
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(b) The Office of the General Counsel
McKinsey & Co. recommended that the responsibility for the
operation of the regional offices be centralized in the OGC ("The
General Counsel Plan") for the following reasons: (1) to achieve a
clear cut separation of investigation and adjudication within the agency,
(2) the need for a single executive to handle the various operations, and
(3) the desire to free Board members from this responsibility to afford
them more time for decision making.224 The report contained the caveat
that this might isolate Board members from policy matters, but sug-
gested that they should retain responsibility for key policymaking, and,
further, that the General Counsel should be held accountable to the
Board.225 Obviously Congress believed that subjecting the General
Counsel to the appointive process was a sufficient check against the
arbitrary use of power, and that the reasons for centralization were
persuasive.226
The complaint that the General Counsel does not provide adequate
review of dismissals has been denied, but there are no official figures to
indicate the number of reversals.22 7 The "unofficial figures" estimate ten
percent. However, the validity of this charge must be weighed against
the reason for separation and the internal process of reviewing dismis-
sals. The Labor Law Section of the American Bar Association reported
in 1964 that the internal review was sufficient to rebut the charges 28
(c) The Hearing
Twenty-five years ago Professor Gelhorn stated, "the agencies'
cautious emulation of their judicial bretheren has not, unfortunately,
proved to be an unmixed blessing.., largely as a consequence, adminis-
trative agencies have not wholly succeeded in providing, as it was in-
tended they should, a speedy form unhampered by legal technicalities
and burdensome delays." 2 9 According to some of the participants, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are far more liberal than those
224 Pucinski Report 1632. For bitter conflict developing between the General Counsel
and the Board, see Klaus, "The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of the National
Labor Relations Board Functions," 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 371 (1958); 96 Cong. Rec.
6883, 6964 (1950).
225 Pucinski Report 1633.
226 See H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1947).
227 Compare General Counsel's testimony before House Special Labor Subcommittee
on Feb. 9, 1966 reported in 61 LRR 10 (figures belie attempt by OGC to proceed only
on sure things).
228 ABA Sec. Lab. Law, op. cit. supra note 180, at 328-29.
229 Gellhorn, Federal Administrative Proceedings 81-82 (1941).
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applied by the trial examiners." ° One authority has stated that, "the
trend [throughout the entire legal system] is toward replacing evidence
rules with discretion, admitting all relevant and useful evidence, and
basing findings on evidence on what responsible persons rely in serious
affairs."2 31 Nothing in NLRB hearings, according to one participant,
justifies any other procedure. However, empirical study of this problem
is wanting.
(d) Board Remedies
Leaving aside the problem of administration of caseload by Board
members, another aspect of the futility of using the Board relates to the
remedies provided by statute. Several of the participants admitted that
there is evidence the remedies provided are not working, and this
reflects a serious disability of the Board to effectuate the purposes of the
statute that goes beyond the question of delay. Since interference with
employment status by employers and unions constitutes the majority of
all unfair labor practice cases filed,23s the remedies provided where an
infraction is found are appropriate to consider. In 1965 a study led Mr.
Bernard Samoff23 3 to conclude that statutory protection against union
interference "hardly provides adequate protection for the working man
against the storms of industrial life. 234 Another study, taken from the
Boston Regional Office records, concerning employer interference led
the author to conclude that, ". . . notices and back pay alone do not
seem to be effective in restoring the 'status quo ante' ",,5 "Reinstate-
ment," he observes, "was a much abused remedy.""3 6 His study indicates
that although 80 percent of the discriminatees indicated a willingness to
accept reinstatement, only 44 percent accepted, and only 13 percent
remained. 37 The author states that the NLRB has put heavy emphasis
230 For the view that generalizations about the application of the federal rules by
courts are questionable, see Wright, Federal Courts § 93, p. 357 n. 4 (1963).
231 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 14.17, p. 335 (1958).
232 National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3) 8(b)(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
amended 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2). Section 8(a)(3) cases
represent 67.4% of all 8(a) cases; and § 8(b) (2) cases represent 31.5% of all 8(b) cases.
30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 180, Table 2 (1965).
233 Samoff, "The Impact of Taft-Hartley Job Discrimination Victories, 4 Ind. Rel. 77
(1965).
234 Id. at 94.
235 Aspin, A Study of Reinstatement Under the National Labor Relations Act 86
(doctoral thesis submitted to Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1966). Compare
Holly, "The Arbitration of Discharge Cases: A Case Study," in Critical Issues in Labor
Arbitration 1 (McKelvey ed. 1957) (inability to select sample rendered statistical measure
impossible).
236 Aspin, id. at 98.
237 Ibid.
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on informal settlements due to a belief that it would facilitate satisfac-
tory compliance, but this was not substantiated by his survey.3 8 The
pervasive reason for settlement, in his opinion, is that,
Heavy pressure is put on the Regional Office to settle the cases
informally. Periodic memoranda from Washington inform the Re-
gional Office when its percentage of Informal Settlement falls below
the national average. To survive, then, it becomes necessary for the
NLRB to have a large number of Informal Settlements. As the
caseload increases it is going to become even more meaningful.23 9
Thus the empirical evidence which tends to substantiate the complaint
that Board remedies are ineffective, indicates that OGC pressure and
futility of process are closely related to increasing caseload and delay.
The structure of the Board must be evaluated in light of how the
agency responds to charges and cases presented. Is the structure of the
NLRB satisfactory to enable it to perform the purposes of the statute?
3. The Caseload and Time Lag Problem
Before consideration of caseload and time lag problems it is
necessary to state a few figures. In the ten-year period up to and in-
cluding 1965, the total caseload of the NLRB increased 109 percent.
240
However, the unfair labor practice cases reflect an increase of 156
percent during this period. 241 "Since," the NLRB reports, "these cases
require more manpower and more processing time than do employee
representation cases [now handled by the Regional Offices] in measur-
ing Agency workload the growth in unfair labor practice charges must
be gauged in higher terms than mere numerical or percentage gains.1124
This growth requires detailed analysis, and the following chart will
provide specificity.
Two facts are evident. First, the percentage increase by year is er-
ratic, and the 156 percent growth24 over this period was not steady.
Second, and most important, the period from 1961-64 reflects an up-
ward trend in the rate of growth. 244 Numerically the 4 year period of
1961-64 reflects the highest growth (+3,128 cases) even though the
238 Id. at 105.
239 Ibid.
240 Figures compiled from NLRB 20-30th Ann. Rep. (1955-1965). The total case
increase for this period was 14,634 charges, supra.
241 20 NLRB Ann. Rep. 5 (1955); 30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 7 (1965).
242 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 4 (1964).
243 See note 240 supra.
244 See note 241 supra and accompanying text.
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THE GROWTH OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES245
Trend of
Rate of Increase
% Increase Increase by Comparing
or Decrease Four Year Four Year
Year Charges Filed By Year Periods Periods
1955 6.171 chas. 4-03/ -
1956 5,265 chgs. -15%
1958* 9,260 chgs. +681 510 Base
1959 12,239 chgs. +57V
1960 11,357 chgs. -07%
1961 12,132 chgs. +079 +317o -07%
1962 13,479 chgs. +11%
1963 14,166 chgs. +050
1964 15,260 chgs. +13%** +26% +08%
* 1958 was selected as the base year (base period
largest percentage increase over a preceding year.
** 1965 showed an increase of +047.
1955-1958) because it reflected the
percentage growth is the smallest (+26 percent). The trend of growth,
however, is up 15 percent over the 1958-1961 period.246
Evaluation of the rising caseload (particularly in unfair labor
practice cases) should be in terms of impact on the process. For this
purpose a useful comparison may be made between the 1958 figures used
by McKinsey & Co. and 1964 figures247 made available by the NLRB.
The first comparison involves "merit factor" (determination that the
charge has validity) and settlements. The second, indicates a compara-
tive analysis of time lag by stage of process.
To state the results of the comparison in percentage, a 69 percent
case increase (with a 12.7 percent increase in merit findings) occasioned
an increase of 2 79 percent in pre-complaint settlements, and an increase
of 223 percent in post-complaint settlements. The enormous increase in
settlements in this seven-year period is very interesting when viewed in
light of the time lag change in this period. This is broken down into
245 Thomas Kenney, NLRB Assistant General Counsel, stated in a speech before the
Federal Bar Association, in the fall of 1965 reported in 60 LRR 73, 74, that the "Board is
now handling the large volume of 30,000 cases per year, and there is no reason to think
that it won't reach 60,000." See also McCulloch, "The Policy, The Purpose and The
Philosophy of the NLRB as Revealed in Decision Trends," reported in 60 LRR 145,
147 (1965) (Board couldn't handle if 95% weren't disposed of voluntarily).
246 See note 243 supra and accompanying chart in text.
247 Compare Pucinski Report 1696, exhibit 4-1 with NLRB Form M-3a (for agency
use only).
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UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CHARGES-MERIT AND SETTLEMENT 248
Merit
Factor Pre-Complaint Post-Complaint
Year Charges Filed % Settlements Settlements
1958 9,260 cgs. 20.7% 725 cases 262 cases
1964 15,620 cigs. 33.4% 2,750 cases 846 cases
Increase* 6,360 chgs. +12.7% 2,025 cases 584 cases
* In 1965 there was a continued increase except for post-complaint settlements.249
three stages: (1) the processing of a charge, (2) the formal hearing of
a complaint, and (3) Board hearing on exception from the trial
examiner's decision. It is important to note that the time (expressed in
days) is median time and not average time.
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE CASES-STAGE & MEDIAN PROCESSING TD&E25O
Increase or
Stage 1958 1964 Decrease
(1) First Stage
Number of Complaints
Issued 541 cases 1,890 cases +1,349 cases
Median Days to
Process 116 days 56 days - 60 days
(2) Second Stage
Number of Decisions
Issued 289 dec. 734 dec. + 445 dec.
Median Days Required 117 days 159 days + 42 days
(3) Third Stage
Percentage of Cases
to Board 5.6% 5.4% - .27
Number of Cases
to Board 353 cases 865 cases + 512 cases
Median Days Required 278 days 136 days - 142 days
Total Days Required
To Process 511 days 351 days - 160 days
248 Figures compiled from 20 NLRB Ann. Rep. 1-3, 5 (1958) and 29 Ann. Rep. 9-23
(1964).
249 In 1965, 15,800 unfair labor practice charges were filed. The merit factor rose to
35.5%. There were 3,003 pre-complaint settlements, and 821 post-complaint settlements.
30 NLRB Ann. Rep. 9-14 (1965).
250 Figures compiled from reports cited in note 247 supra. Note figures represent
median processing time (indicating one-half processed faster and one-half slower).
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Despite an increase of 249 percent in complaints (not charges) ac-
tually issued, the median days required to process these cases fell by
more than 50 percent. Due to the increase in complaints, a decrease of
.2 percent in unfair labor practices going to the Board resulted in an
increase of over 500 cases which substantiates the significance of the
OGC pressing for settlements in order to reduce Board caseload.
Despite the fact that the Board members had an increase of 145 percent
in unfair labor practice cases, they cut the time required to process
these cases byover 50 percent. In fact the entire time to process these
cases (median time) in all stages declined by 31 percent.25 ' Several
inferences can be drawn from these facts. First, the significance of
settlements in light of the dramatic increase in charges filed (charges
up 6,360 in seven-year period) cannot be denied. This would explain
the pressure from the OGC for settlement. Second, it is important for
the OGC to limit the number of cases going to the Board members for
decision. Even though more cases went to the Board (an increase of
512) during this period and there was a decrease in handling time
(a decrease of 142 days), the decrease was due to incresed efficiency and
the delegation of representation cases to the regional offices. 252 It
cannot be assumed that continued increases will not cause a serious
breakdown of the Board process without other delegations and greater
pressure for settlements. Third, the median days required for Board
cases is just under one year, but one-half of the cases take much
longer. For example, the variation from the total median days, that is,
median time was 389 days while longest time was 879 days, 25 3 is
considerable.
251 One explanation for this is that representational cases (R cases) are handled by
the Regional Offices (since 1961). In 1964 the Regional Offices issued 1,890 decisions of
which the Board reviewed 379. 29 NLRB Ann. Rep. 17 (1964).
252 Ibid. See Rothman, op. cit. supra note 217, at 79 (efficiency needed to handle
increases).
253 For comment that median figures don't tell entire story, see Pucinski Report 10.
Indication of how median figures (those used in annual reports) may be misleading can
be gleaned from NLRB Form M-3a chart for period of January till June 1965 showing
median, low time, high time, lower quartile, and upper quartile figures.
Unfair Labor Practice Cases* (Jan.-June 1965)
Filing to Complaint to Close of Hear'g
Complaint Close of Hear'g to Decision
Median 60 Days 71 Days 119 Days
Low 5 Days 22 Days 26 Days
High 450 Days 315 Days 384 Days
Low Quartile 46 Days 57 Days 74 Days
Upper Quart. 95 Days 94 Days 170 Days
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In a field where time is of the essence, the time lag shown gives
substance to the statements of futility expressed by the participants.
Moreover, pressure for settlement is not desirable per se. If the policies
of the act are to be effectuated, "merit," not caseload, should determine
whether complaints should issue and be pressed. Further, once a
complaint issues, based on "merit," attention should be paid to the
nature of the settlement. Otherwise settlement may become another
"move" available to the contestants. In light of this empirical evidence
the question posed by one of the participants may well be asked---"is
the tail wagging the dog"?
4. Summary
Any analysis of Board process requires an answer to the critical
problem of why the trend of Board caseload is upward in light of the
statutory policy to preserve industrial peace. 54 In 1939 Professor Lon
Fuller provided the key to answering this question. "The great accom-
plishment of legislative reform of recent years," he said, "such as the
Securities Exchange Act and the National Labor Relations Act, will
probably not be firmly established until the philosophy which underlies
them has gone over into and become a part of the common law. In the
long run men are ruled by accepted beliefs, not by legislative fiat.2255
Assertions, however, must not be measured abstractly. For example, to
accept charges that the NLRB is subject to political bias without
relating this to process is to ignore the purpose for which the Board was
established-to ".... define and prescribe practices on the part of labor
and management which affect commerce and are inimical to the general
welfare, and to protect the right of the public in connection with labor
disputes affecting commerce."'2 5 On the other hand, the "political
factor" cannot be ignored as it affects process. As Board members align
Trial Exam. Dec. Total Variation From
To Bd. Decision Time Median Time
Median 116 Days 389 Days -
Low 43 Days 128 Days 261 Days
High 566 Days 879 Days 490 Days
Low Quartile 87 Days 319 Days 70 Days
Upper Quart. 177 Days 491 Days 102 Days
* These figures cover cases originating from Boston Regional Office.
254 See note 6 supra.
255 Fuller, Book Review, "The Formative Era of American Law, Pound," 34 III. L.
Rev. 372, 373 (1939).
256 National Labor Relations Act § 1(a), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 151(a).
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themselves with shifts in political parties by speech making, rule
making, or adjudication, they provide the parties involved with tactics
whereby one contestant can gain an advantage over his adversary.2 5
If such tactics allow abuse of process, the parties will not hesitate to
use them in light of the "table stakes" involved. 58
There is sufficient empirical evidence to support the contention
that the NLRB structure is subject to such abuse. The OGC centralized
control of what was proven to be an in efficient regional structure. The
OGC undoubtedly has improved the operation through centralization.
However, despite the fact that there is no evidence to support the
contention that the OGC has abused its power, there is evidence to
indicate that the increasing caseload has resulted in tremendous
pressures for settlement. Moreover, rigidity of hearings and futility of
Board remedies reinforce such pressures. The trend in caseload and
settlement indicates that these pressures will not abate. Each of these
factors makes it possible for the parties to interpose their preferences
even though contrary to statutory policy. This conclusion does not
prove that different institutional characteristics would produce a system
where the preferences of the parties would not prevail. It does show
how these preferences work within the present framework of the NLRB
process. The final question to be considered is whether such analysis
is useful in resolving the problems existing in labor relations today.
III. RELEVANCE: POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS OF THE
PARTICIPANTS' EVALUATION
Space limitation prohibits exhaustive application of process anal-
ysis to the myriad labor relations problems. This will have to await
exposition at a later date. Three examples will be used to indicate the
relevance. The first two concern internal problems within each institu-
tion. First, the problem of nonacceptance of new arbitrators will be
discussed. Second, this paper will consider the suggestion that caseload
(and undesirable pressures for settlement) can be relieved by limiting
Board review. The third application will deal with process difficulties
arising out of Board deference to arbitration.
257 See Hall, "Responsibility of the President and Congress for Regulatory Policy
Development," 26 Law & Contemp. Prob. 261, 275 (1961) (inconsistency in legislation
reflects inconsistency in country at large).
2 8 Compare Fanning, "Labor Issues Before the Supreme Court," Address at Loyola
University School of Law, Oct. 20, 1959 (press release No. 634) (line between legality
and illegality grows thinner), wiuth McCulloch, op. cit. supra note 245, at 146 (we see a
more sophisticated probing to find every possible loophole in the statute).
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A. The Training of New Arbitrators and Acceptability: Catching Up
With the Demand259
One of the participants believed it unnecessary to train great
numbers of new arbitrators, but said that proper training of small
groups was essential, and could be accomplished best by regular
academic instruction. Preferably, he thought, this training should be
through an inter-disciplinary study in economics, law, and business
courses. In a recent article, Professors Jones and Smith suggested that
the appointive agencies have "the greatest opportunity and perhaps the
major responsibility in this area [placing new arbitrators] ."260 They
noted that the agencies should be careful in selection, and suggested
that qualifications be checked, apprenticeships be established, and new
names should be circulated. 61
A brief survey of the recent but intensive study of this problem
indicates the difficulties. In 1950 the National Academy of Arbitrators
Committee on Research and Education proposed a twofold training
program (to train new arbiters and help others acquire more ability)
that included the study of reported cases, attendance at hearings and
initial conferences, and involvement in less complicated cases at lower
fees . 62 Five years later, a subcommittee suggested programs of intern-
ship with appointive agencies and individual arbitrators, and increased
instruction.263 A survey was taken in 1960 at the behest of the editor
of publications of the NAA to evaluate the less than twelve existing
apprenticeships. 6 4 Mr. Zack found that three out of the seven who
replied had succeeded in arbitrating cases of their own after the
program. He concluded that: (1) all apprentices would not succeed,
(2) the apprenticeship program takes several years, (3) scholastic
training was insufficient alone, and (4) trainees would need mediation
experience, work with appointive agencies (but not government or legal
269 For a less current reform plan, e.g., to amend the United States Arbitration Act,
61 Stat. 669 (1947), as amended 68 Stat. 1233 (1954), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, see Note,
"Proposed Labor Arbitration Law," 9 Lab. L.J. 306 (1958); 'Panel Discussion: The
Proposed Uniform Arbitration Act," in Critical Issues in Labor Arbitration 112 (McKelvey
ed. 1957).
260 Jones & Smith, "Report with Comments," 62 Mich. L. Rev. 1115, 1133 (1964).
Compare Workshop, "The Development of Qualified New Arbitrators," in 1962 Proceed-
ings NAA 205-28.
261 Ibid.
262 Committee on Training New Arbitrators, "Appendix D Replenishment of Pro-
fessional Arbitrators," in 1964 Proceedings NAA 317-18.
263 Subcommittee on Education and Training, "Appendix E Report and Recom-
mendations," in Management Rights And the Arbitration Process 230 (McKelvey ed. 1956).
264 Zack, "Appendix C, An Evaluation of Arbitration Apprenticeships," in Challenges
to Arbitration 169 (McKelvey ed. 1960).
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work because of the label of "bias"), and apprenticeship.265 Again in
1962, the National Academy held a panel discussion. The panel
included the American Bar Association, Labor Law Section Chairman
and representatives from the appointive agencies. 66 The purpose was
to evolve uniform methods of training, and ways of gaining accept-
ability. There was less than complete agreement among the panel as
to the methods of achieving these objectives.26 7 Finally in 1964, the
Committee for the Replenishment of New Arbitrators (NAA) reported
the progress to the membership.268 It stated three conclusions. First,
most of the work of training had been left to the appointive agencies.
Next, only 14.5 percent of the arbitrators contributed as trainers,
and last, that most of the accepted arbitrators had not had prior train-
ing. The percentage of those who had apprenticeships had remained
constant for two decades. 69 Accordinly, the committee announced that
the National Academy had agreed with the appointive agencies to run a
"Chicago Training Program" as a pilot model for those areas in the
country where there was a shortage of available and qualified arbi-
trators.270 The program lasted from September of 1962 to December
1963, and included fourteen selected trainees (five of whom did not
complete the program). If one trainee, who withdrew because he felt
the program was hurting him, is eliminated from the statistics, the
short-run success of the project must be considered poor. Of the 190
submissions of the trainees as arbitrators during the year, there were
three acceptances involving two trainees.27' The report indicated that
"it is possible that one or two arbitrators may yet emerge from this
program." 72 The participants indicated that results of similar programs
in Pennsylvania and Ohio were not much improved.273 This approach
cannot be considered an overwhelming success statistically.
265 Mr. Zack suggested: (1) a public relations program, (2) apprenticeship extensions,
(3) a clearing house for information, and (4) work programs at unions and companies.
Id at 173.
266 Mr. Livingston (ABA) suggested tighter standards. Mr. Simkin (FMCS) stressed
screening procedures. Mr. Herzog (AAA) indicated problem of "blacklistings." Mr. Seward
(NAA) said classroom and apprenticeship of little value. Workshop, supra note 260, at
205-08.
267 Ibid.
268 Committee on Training New Arbitrators, supra note 262, at 317.
269 The reasons listed were the personal relationship between the arbitrator and their
clients, and the time-cost factor to the trainees and their instructors. Id. at 320.
270 Id. at 324. Note that the unions accepted 47 times and management 21 times,
exclusive of the trainee who withdrew.
271 Ibid.
272 Id. at 324-25.
273 See ABA Sec. Lab. Law, 1965 Proceedings 254-56 (1965) for a different approach
used in St. Louis, Mo. where ABA sent list of 29 persons screened to appointive agencies.
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It is possible, however, to analyze this problem in light of the
information derived from the participants. The acceptability of new
arbitrators is related to the selection process. In his report Mr. Zack
stated that even "qualified people" may not be acceptable. 27 4 It is the
necessity of "acceptability" rather than a lack of organized effort to
train new people that limits entry. Therefore, any plan to be successful
must take this into consideration. The problem is one of supply and
demand. Emphasis on supply is not enough, even though the supply
must include qualified people. "Qualification" will be screened by the
selection process, but the demand is not entirely sensitive to variation
in qualifications because "ability" is not the only criteria. The problem
is to influence the demand. The solution may not lie with the appointive
agencies, because they cannot retain their neutral position and at the
same time become embroiled in the selection process. An individual
and persistent appeal must be made to unions and management per-
sonnel who select arbitrators. For example, a prestigious organization
like the National Academy might establish a committee to seek out the
selecting parties, and ask them to evaluate their arbitration problems
and agree to a panel consisting of new names, from whatever appointive
agency they use, for less important cases.275 The parties would select
from such a list of qualified but new people. Information concerning
such an agreement could then be passed on to the appointive agencies
who could screen new names for those submissions. The difficulty with
reported pressures exerted thus far might be that they have been made
by "vested interest" agencies or by general appeal (as opposed to
individual appeal) in connection with specific problems and existing
relationships between employed arbitrators and their clients. Respected
men in the field, and there are many, may have to call on past clients
and "sell them" fact to face with the importance of accepting new
people. Unions and management have been willing to take longer
chances before particularly when the appeal is non-financial and
involves a commitment for the future. The point is that any solution
must consider the nature of the selection process and its objectives, and
not just quantitative needs.
B. Limiting Board Review: Reorganization Plan No. 5 Revisited276
Concern with the operational process of agencies is not novel. In
a speech delivered before Congress, the late President John F. Kennedy
274 Zack, op. cit. supra note 264, at 169.
275 Cf. Fleming, The Labor Arbitration Process 103-106 (Ill. 1965) (many decisions
predictable).
276 Reorganization Plan No. 5 of 1961, H.R. Doc. No. 5 of 1961, H.R. Doc. No. 172,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
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said of regulatory agencies, "the discharge by the regulatory agencies
of the government of the responsibilities that Congress has placed upon
them must be a consistent and continuing concern of both the Congress
and the President. 277 He listed as his goals: (1) the sharpening of
agency responsibility, (2) the reduction of excessive delays and work-
loads, and (3) the improvement of administrative procedures. 7 8 This
speech was followed by another proposing adoption of Reorganization
Plan No. 5 of 1961.279
The purpose of the statute was to permit a delegation of unfair
labor practice cases from Board members to trial examiners while
retaining a certiorari-type review. 0 In substance the plan authorized
the Board, in its discretion, to publicly delegate any of its functions
(including hearings, determinations, orders, certifications, report, and
other actions) to a panel of the Board, individual Board members,
hearing examiners, or employees of the Board2 8 The Board was to
retain the right of discretionary review on its own motion, or that of
another, by a vote of one less than a majority of the Board, and limita-
tion of review by the Board (or an employee thereof) or failure to act
by the parties was deemed an action of the Board.2 2 This aspect of the
plan affects the NLRB process in the very sensitive area of the distribu-
tion of workload between the regional offices, trial examiners, and
Board members, and thus, has an obvious relationship to the problem of
time lag. Another reason for considering this proposal is that it flows
from the reports of two Congressional committees that made extensive
studies of NLRB procedures. The first report was made in 1960 by the
U.S. Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law (Cox Panel)
to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.23 The second,
was made in 1961, by the Subcommittee on the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (Pucinski Report) to the House Committee on Education
and Labor. 4 Neither of these reports contained the express language
of Reorganization Plan No. 5, but both reports described the delay
problem and recommended changes. 8 5
277 107 Cong. Rec. 5847 (1961).
278 Id. at 5847-50.
279 H.R. Doc. No. 172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
280 See 107 Cong. Rec. 5847-50 (1961).
281 Id. §§ (a)-(b) at 2, 3.
282 Id. §§ (b), (c) at 2, 3.
283 U.S. Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations, 86th Cong. 1st Sess.,
Report on Organization and Procedure of the National Labor Relations Board (Gov't
Print 1960) [hereinafter cited as 'Cox Panel'].
284 Pucinski Report.
285 The Cox Panel stated, "these shocking delays seriously affect the usefulness of
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The House of Representatives *defeated the plan2 6 primarily
because of the "broad and vague" nature of the delegation of an-
thority.8 7 There is no consensus of opinion currently about such a
delegation. Suggestions irary from the delegation of unfair labor prac-
tices to trial examiners (as suggested in Reorganization Plan No. 5)28
to revoking the delegation of representational elections made to the
regional offices in 1961.289 There has also been legislation proposed to
remove all unfair labor practice cases from the NLRB, and transfer
them to the federal courts. °
It terms of criteria developed from the interviews, the plan is
feasible. For example, the plan is not substantially different from the
present operation of the NLRB from the standpoint of the "political
factor." Arguably the delegation of unfair labor practice cases to non-
political civil service employees for final determination would place
most of the decisions with unbiased "judge-like" personnel. However,
the change would not cause such a shift for two reasons. First, although
there is some statistical variation as to how many decisions by trial
examiners are now upheld by the Board, the evidence indicates the
figure is substantial.29 1 Second, the Board members would still control
the important policy cases by discretionary review as well as standards
developed either by the case-by-case or rule making authority. Even
though delegation to the trial examiners would leave the allegations of
undesirable variation in their abilities unanswered, this problem is not
insurmountable if it exists at all. The selection process of the civil
the National Labor Relations Act," and recommended that Administrator should determine
validity of charge with appeal to Board. The Trial Examiner should hear on merits if
dispute still existed with limited review by Board, op. cit. supra note 283, at 10, 23-24.
The Pucinski Report found "long delay in processing . . . renders final labor board
decisions almost nugatory," and suggested Board study adopting principle of limited
review or, in the alternative, legislation, supra at 16, 20.
286 The plan was defeated in the House of Representatives on July 20, 1961 by a
vote of 231 to 179. 48 LREM 77 (1961). Compare H.R. REP. NO. 576, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1961) (Board can delegate without approval).
287 Either House of Congress has "veto power" over reorganization. See Harris,
Congressional Control of Administration 213 .(1964).
288 Chairman McCulloch stated the Board still favors Reorganization Plan No. 5,
61 LRR 97 (1966).
289 See ABA Sec. Lab. Law, 1964 Proceedings 317-19 (1964).
290 See 109 Cong. Rec. 15196-200 (1963) for discussion of H.R. 8246, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1963). See also Rothman, "In Search of Improving the Administration of the
National Labor Relations Act," 13 Lab LJ. 777, 782-84 (1962) (other proposals).
291 Compare General Counsel Ordman's statement that acceptance of Trial
Examiners' reports by Board has gone up to 30% (from 25%) in 61 LRR 98 (1966),
with Chairman McCulloch's testimony that only 22% of reports were rejected in 48
LRRM 78 (1961). Difference in statistics is accounted for in part by parties acceptance.
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service and the removal grounds under the Administrative Procedure
Act could be used to weed out incompetence.292
From the standpoint of impact, the efficiency of this plan has many
advantages. Under Reorganization Plan No. 5, the initial complaint
would presumably still originate in the Regional Offices with appeal to
the OGC. Even though no time saving could be projected in this stage,
the time lag between the trial examiner stage and the Board decision
could be reduced insofar as finality of decision is concerned. For
example, in 1965 the median time to reach the trial examiner's interim
report was approximately ten months while it took an additional two
months to get a Board Decision.293 It should be noted that these are
median figures so that one-half of the cases took longer. If the Board
rendered a prompt decision on whether it would review, at least two
months could be saved. This would not assume any additional trial
examiners since they now hear the cases first. Further, the fact that the
Board members would be relieved from de novo review of all cases
in which there are exceptions filed would discourage frivolous applica-
tions and allow more time for making quick determinations as to
whether the Board should grant review. In 1964 the Board handled 865
cases which indicates the volume of the workload being discussed.294
Thus the plan would have the advantage of lowering the number of
cases that are now "mooted out" as well as allowing Board members
greater contact with the cases they accept for review. Hopefully, release
from caseload pressure would create greater efficiency in case han-
dling.2"' Release from this pressure also might alleviate the necessity
of the General Counsel imposing rigid target dates on regional offices
which in turn result in settlement pressures in all types of claims.
The strongest argument against the plan is that discretionary
review by Board members when coupled with the OGC's review of
charges that are rejected by the regional offices might seriously hamper
due process. In addition to the fact that lack of due process cannot be
substantiated in regard to the OGC's present role, there are two addi-
tional reasons that mitigate against this argument. First, Board refusal
to review is final action, and, therefore, reviewable by the courts.29 6
292 Section 11: "Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are em-
ployed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commission
.... " Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 237 (1947), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1958).
293 The median figures from Jan.-June 1965 indicated the period from charge till
Trial Examiners' decision was 307 days, and an additional time of 62 days was required till
Board decision. NLRB Form M-3a.
294 Chart cited by note 250 supra.
295 See Pucinski Report 1682-93 for 1961 evaluation of Board members' efficiency.
298 Reorganization Plan No. 5, H.R. DOC. NO. 172, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961),
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Actually this would allow faster review than is now possible since the
Board must now handle exceptions on a de novo basis. Second, it is
obvious that the Board members must be relieved from the growing
caseload if the existing process is to have any meaning at all. The
possibility of an internal abuse of due process is dwarfed by the existing
facts of staggering caseloads and delay. Even though improvements
have taken place, the indications are that under the present system
longer delays are inevitable. The courts can check violations of due
process, but Board members are helpless to control overuse of adjudica-
tion by the parties. The significance of this plan is that it deals with
agency operation, and requires analysis based on its impact on the
process.
C. An Approach to the Problem of Accommodating Arbitration and
Board Adjudication
The final example of the relevance of process analysis involves
the problems arising out of the interrelationship of arbitration and
Board adjudication. Definitive application must await further research.
However, an approach to specific problems can be derived from a
reevaluation of the current disputes centering around deference to
arbitration. Do the preferences of the participants reflect the continuing
criticism and assist in evaluating new plans for accommodation? The
answer aids in understanding the context from which the criticism
evolves, and provides analytical tools to deal with possible reforms. The
basic assumptions underlying the criticisms provide a framework from
which one may assess the validity of the allegations. It is not enough
to say that a certain comment reflects an irrational prejudice, because
the comment is only relevant from the particular stance of the eval-
uator. Criticisms in the complex field of labor relations are seldom
susceptible to a "yes or no" evaluation. Certainly this is true of the
"in-my-experience" type of comments that are prevalent in labor rela-
tions. However, such statements must be analyzed because, as the
evaluation of the participants indicates, these attitudes will be trans-
lated into actions which may result in compliance or rejection of the
laws that attempt to regulate these activities. For example, it is one
thing to indicate that the parties shall not select an arbitrator on the
basis of personal advantage2 1 7 or provide that an employee shall not be
discriminated against for union activity,298 but it is quite another thing
§ (c) "Should the right to exercise such discretionary review be declined . . . then the
action . . . shall for all purposes, including appeal or review thereof, be deemed to be
the action of the Board."
297 See note 93 supra.
298 National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(3), 8(b)(2), 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as
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to attempt to enforce the rules without the agreement of the parties
involved. Their attitudes constitute the extent of voluntary compliance,
or the extent to which such rules may be imposed as well as the sanc-
tions necessary to force compliance. The test to be applied to these
attitudes and criticisms is one of relevance. Are these continuing
criticisms relevant to the problems of the process? If so, how does this
affect consideration of new proposals?
For example, one cannot shunt Judge Hays' views with the com-
ment that his condemnation is too sweeping and undocumented if for
no other reason than his comments about arbitrators (as opposed to the
process) bear a striking resemblance to comments received from the
participants in relation to the selection process. Management concern
about ability does not refute his comments that many arbitrators (liter-
ally thousands) are wholly unfitted for their jobs; not having the
knowledge, training, skill, intelligence, or character, 9 9 despite the
statistics concerning the average arbitrator. Judge Hays opined that
a judge should be isolated from a system where he is beholden to his
employers.300 This comment is analogous to those made by the partici-
pants who suggested that "fee splitting" was an important consideration
in the selection process. Judge Hays stated that arbitrators could
deviate from the provisions of a contract and be upheld by the courts." 1
Both union and management lawyers agreed that the present criteria
of "drawing his essence from the contract" in regard to judicial review
might permit this. One interpretation of Judge Hays' remarks would
be that he was stating that a process involving people without the
requisite expertise who use extraneous factors to make a decision, or
who are guided by personal motivations should not be given carte
blanche approval by the judicial system.302 Is this refuted by the fact
that there are skilled arbitrators who are invaluable for specialized
problems? Isn't this notion a flamboyant (perhaps exaggerated) way
of saying that too much is hidden under the banner of expertise?
Mr. Justice Douglas contended that arbitration performs "func-
tions not normal to courts, '30 3 and used as examples of proper con-
siderations "the effect upon productivity of a particular result,
amended 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(3), (b)(2). See note 232 supra and
accompanying text.
299 Hays, Labor Arbitration a Dissenting View 112 (Yale 1966).
-00 Ibid.
01 Id. at 80-82. But see Torrington Co. v. Metal Products Workers Union Local 1645,
362 F.2d 677 (1966) (contra, where arbitrator has no authority under collective bargaining
agreement).
302 Hays, id. at 112.
303 United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
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consequences to the morale of the ship, [and] his judgment whether
tensions will be heightened or diminished."304 Yet every arbitrator
interviewed said this statement not only went beyond what they did,
but, what they wanted to do." 5 Management, with their traditional
distrust of cooperative ventures, is unlikely to submit to this brand
of "industrial justice" whatever the attitude of the courts may be.
Official expression of this policy will cause the parties to overemphasize
the selection process with its commensurate effect of slowing down the
process, and "a fortiori" increasing the costs.
Chairman McCulloch, on the other hand, considered the advan-
tages of arbitration to be flexibility of remedies and application as
well as speed.30 6 These advantages go to process and not personality.
For the process to be workable, institutional arrangements should
conform to these advantages, and the process should not be deferred
to on the basis of what the parties may consider a disadvantage. For
example, deference to arbitration should not be based on the mistaken
notion that the arbitrator will by the nature of his occupation know
more about a specific problem than the courts. The parties will resist
such application through the selection process. This does not prove
Judge Hays was right in his solution to the problems of arbitration, but
it does indicate that his criticism was relevant. The difficulty with his
conclusion is that it ignores the procedural advantages of the institution
of arbitration. Although Judge Hays concedes the procedural advan-
tages in arbitration, be concludes that these could be "readily adopted
to a public system of justice and made available in our courts." 307 This
ignores the flexibility and speed of arbitration as evidenced by the
growing desire of the parties to fit arbitration to their needs3 08 More-
over, in 1963, in Judge Hays' circuit, there were over 10,000 cases
filed with a median disposition of sixteen months; and even when no
court action was involved, the median disposition was thirteen
months 09 Appointment of a master-arbitrator by the courts, even if
expedited, could not match the present speed of the arbitration process;
and further would add pressure to the existing caseload in the courts.
Assuming that speed could be achieved, would Judge Hays provide
the variety of forms and limitations of the arbitrator-mediator (for
304 Id. at 582.
205 Compare Seitz, "Grievance Arbitration and the National Labor Policy," in 18th
Ann. Conference on Lab. 201 (BNA 1966) (effulgance of royalty illusory).
306 McCulloch, "The Arbitration Issue in National Labor Board Decisions," 19
Arb. J. (ns.) 134, 136 (1964).
307 Hays, op. cit. supra note 299, at 116.
308 McCulloch, supra note 306, at 136. See "1964 Survey," in 1965 Proceedings NAA
248, for figures showing increasing use of the specialized "forms" of arbitration.
09 Dir. of Administrative Office of U.S. Courts, 1963 Ann. Rep. 209 Table C.
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example, impartial chairmen)? His answer to this might be the sug-
gestion of "labor courts," but this is based on "special expertise," not
speed or flexibility.3 10 The expertise goes to personality, and not
procedural advantage. Judge Hays' solution would presumably change
the selection process (or eliminate it) by moving arbitration to another
forum. Even though this paper will not attempt to analyze labor courts,
there are several obvious objections to this suggestion. It assumes a
dissatisfaction with the process, or a preference for another forum that
cannot be substantiated by empirical investigation. The suggestion does
not indicate what procedures would be used to discover the arbitrator's
ability. Since only one-third of all arbitrators devote full time to this
function, there remains the question of the transfer of qualified per-
sonnel to serve as master-arbitrators. The labor court alternative
presumes the arbitration process cannot function properly under the
present system because of what might be termed "personal defi-
ciencies," and yet this is currently being handled by the selection
process. Finally, labor courts would destroy the advantage of mutuality
in the selection process. These observations may not refute Judge Hays'
proposal of labor courts, but suggest that a host of questions must be
considered prior to its serious consideration. 11 Moreover, they indicate
that Mr. Justice Douglas' evaluation of the arbitration process (as
opposed to arbiters) was closer to the participants' evaluation of it.
Their increasing use of the process justifies the conclusion that the
arbitral forum is effective.
This approach to contemporary criticisms indicates that deference
to arbitration should be predicated on an appreciation of the operation
of the process as well as an understanding of the impact of deference
on it.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Examination of the "preferences and prejudices" of the partici-
pants in the labor relations field provides a basis for institutional evalua-
tion. This type of empirical research is not only helpful but necessary
for useful analysis, because enforceability of labor laws depends on the
acceptance by the parties of the institutions that are created to effectuate
statutory policy. Labor policy has as its goal workable institutions that
will allow the parties self-government within a framework that will not
obstruct the free flow of commerce.
The pragmatic necessity of such arrangements is proved by the
growth and use of the arbitral process. Arbitration has inherent prob-
lems that are the inevitable result of the competition that now exists
310 Hays, op. cit. supra note 299, at 117.
311 Cf. Straus, "Labor Arbitration and Its Critics," 20 Arb. J. (ns.) 197, 209 (1965)
(if disabilities are not resolved labor courts may be inevitable).
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between unions and management in this country. The selection problem,
for example, which is an integral part of ad hoc arbitration has caused
delay in the process. In addition, arbitration has become expensive for
small unions and small businesses alike. These difficulties, and the
critics who point them out, cannot be ignored because arbitration must
provide a mutually acceptable unexpensive and speedy process to be of
value. The growth of arbitration and the refusal to accept new arbi-
trators may well negate these advantages. Since the selection process
cannot be substantially altered to force "acceptability," long range
plans are necessary now to allow a gradual acceptance of new people
in the field. This can be accomplished by outside pressures. However,
interference with selection that impinges on the reasons for this process
may solidify these problems and make the arbitral forum undesirable.
Alternative channels must exist to maximize the freedom and
flexibility of arbitration rather than make the process rigid. This is
particularly important where public policy, such as the prohibition of
unfair labor practices, is involved in disputes. The NLRB which has
jurisdiction over such activities has been subjected to dual pressure
from legislators and the parties who use it. The preferred vantage point
from which to evaluate this institution is the manner in which it
currently operates in labor relations, because this indicates whether the
parties are accepting the process. The evidence of a strong trend toward
growing charges and the resultant futility of Board operation is undeni-
able. Measures must be taken to halt this trend. The parties have
reacted adversely to the concept that the rules developed vary coinci-
dentally with a change in the political party of the executive. This type
of fluctuation and instability, rather than the politics involved, make
the process vulnerable to abuse by the parties. In addition, weak
enforcement of the remedies provided by statue contributes to dis-
regard of the present consequences of violating the laws. Even though
the Board and Congress have taken steps to correct inefficiency existing
within the structure of the NLRB, further delegation of duties is
desirable to fight the increasing time lag.
An understanding of the operational structure of each institution
is essential to deal with the interrelationship of arbitration and NLRB
adjudication. The problems arising from this interaction should be
evaluated within the labor relations context. Process analysis provides
a framework within which the existing arrangements can be weighed.
The present restricted focus on decisions often fails to acknowledge
the impact of the self-serving tendencies of the parties on the decisional
process. These tendencies are often evidenced by apparent hostility
toward institutions. However, they may also undermine the intended
effect of our labor laws by abusing the institutional process.
